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This dissertation focuses on issues related to economic globalization and its implications 
for the domestic economy. The first two chapters pertain to international financial integration, 
while the last chapter studies the impact of interprovincial migration in China as a result of 
industrialization. 
The first chapter develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that accounts 
for the asymmetric cyclical features of fiscal policy between developed and emerging market 
countries. Sovereign borrowing with a default option implies that creditors require a higher risk 
premium when countries experience a sequence of negative shocks and accumulate debt, thereby 
deterring risk sharing and intertemporal consumption smoothness. The default option is shown to 
be the key driver for procyclical government consumption and transfer payments observed in 
emerging market countries, suggesting that sovereign default has significant effects on risk 
sharing and the behavior of fiscal policy. 
The second chapter explores how international financial integration provides risk sharing 
opportunities, paying particular attention to the diverse theoretical predictions for the 
consumption path responding to various types of income shocks. The results suggest that there is 
less than full consumption risk sharing overall, while OECD countries are insured better against 
predictable changes in transitory income. I also show that financial integration improves 
consumption risk sharing on the whole. The results support the hypothesis that financial 
integration leads to an even larger adjustment in consumption in response to a permanent shock 
xi 
 
to income growth. This can explain the higher relative volatility of consumption growth in the 
1990s in emerging market countries. 
The last chapter examines the impacts of interprovincial migration at different 
educational levels on the creation and distribution of human capital in China. The observed 
external economies and diseconomies of gross outflow migration on new human capital 
investment are consistent with the mechanism of migration-oriented investment/disinvestment in 
higher education at source provinces. This positive externality eclipses the negative one at the 
national level. Moreover, the effects of net outflow migration on new human capital investment, 
based on the changes in relative labor supply, mitigate direct brain drain by both encouraging and 





This dissertation consists of three independent articles related to the effects of economic 
globalization. Economic globalization in this context goes beyond the development of extensive 
trade links. The expansion of the international capital market is another important pillar of 
economic globalization, which in turn, I will argue, introduces a dynamic that affects the very 
foundations of domestic economies. 
The first two articles of this dissertation pertain to international financial integration and 
its macroeconomic implications. International financial integration has advanced dramatically in 
the last several decades following the initial steps toward the integration of goods and services 
trade. Many countries, including those classified under the labels “emerging market” and 
“developing” liberalized their capital account transactions; and as a consequence  we have 
observed a surge in the cross-border holdings of financial assets. However, the international 
financial market is severely constrained by various types of incompleteness. Therefore, 
frictionless market models are often poor approximations of actual market dynamics. Moreover, 
since international financial markets occasionally become unstable, some policymakers are 
skeptical about their ability to fully rely on these markets during economic downturns. Chapter II, 
“Sovereign Risk and Procyclical Fiscal Policy in Emerging Market Economies” proposes a 
theoretical model focusing on this incompleteness—namely, the existence of the default option, 
which explains procyclical government consumption and transfer payments in emerging market 
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countries. Chapter III, “Financial Integration and Consumption Risk Sharing” is an empirical 
attempt to answer the question: Does international financial integration improve consumption 
risk sharing? In particular, it focuses on the stochastic properties of the income process and the 
different theoretical predictions for the consumption path responding to various types of income 
shocks under perfect risk sharing. 
Shifting focus from the international financial market, Chapter IV studies an aspect of the 
transition and development of the Chinese economy. China has undergone tremendous change in 
its transformation to a “world factory” during the last several decades, particularly in its urban 
areas in the coastal region. Rapid industrialization has enlarged disparities in income between 
coastal and inland provinces as well as between urban and rural areas. Together with the 
deregulation of the household/residential registration system, this widening inequality creates a 
strong economic incentive for migration from poorer provinces to richer provinces. “The Effects 
of Interprovincial Migration on Human Capital Formation in China” investigates how this surge 
in interprovincial migration affects the incentive to invest in formal schooling in China. We infer 
how migration affects national and regional economic growth through altering human capital 
formation by studying the impacts of migration at different educational levels on the creation and 




Sovereign Risk and Procyclical Fiscal Policy 
in Emerging Market Economies 
Abstract 
This paper develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that accounts for the 
differences in the cyclical features of fiscal policy between developed and emerging market 
countries, and in particular procyclical government consumption and transfer payments in 
emerging market countries. I develop a small open economy model with a sovereign government 
that has access to international credit markets with the default option. The government 
maximizes public utility by adjusting (i) its asset position in the international capital market, (ii) 
government consumption, and (iii) transfer payments to households. Government consumption is 
defined as the sum of a public goods component that is directly beneficial to households, and a 
hidden transfer payment component. These hidden transfers appear in national accounts as 
government consumption, however, I argue they behave more as transfers. The government finds 
this hidden transfer payment component useful as it is more flexible over the cycle than the 
standard institutionalized transfer programs like social security. The option to default implies that 
creditors require a higher risk premium when the sovereign government experiences a sequence 
of negative shocks and accumulates debt, thereby deterring risk sharing and intertemporal 
consumption smoothing. The model is solved numerically and calibrated to two cases: the 
Mexican and the US economies. It replicates the differences in the fiscal policy over the business 
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cycle in emerging market and developed countries. The default option is shown to be the key 
driver for the asymmetries observed in the data, suggesting that sovereign default has significant 
effects on risk sharing and the behavior of fiscal policy. 
 
II.1 Introduction 
Empirical evidence indicates a sharp contrast in the cyclical patterns of fiscal policies1 
between developed and developing countries. Talvi and Végh (2005) and Riascos and Végh 
(2004) have documented that the contemporaneous correlations between government 
consumption and GDP are positive in developing countries, while they are near zero in G7 
countries. Since changing the tax rates requires legislative procedures and the government often 
encounters a mass objection when it plans to raise the tax rates, it is quite reasonable to consider 
that tax rates are more subject to inertia2 than government spending in the business cycle 
frequency. Therefore, the observed cyclicality of government consumption implies that the fiscal 
policy tends to be procyclical in developing countries and less so or acyclical in developed 
countries. This procyclical fiscal policy stance in developing countries is puzzling, in the sense 
that it is consistent with neither the Keynesian model nor Barro’s tax-smoothing model—the 
models typically used by economists to understand the optimal fiscal policy over the business 
cycle. Standard Keynesian model claims that expansionary fiscal policy is a useful tool to 
mitigate recession through multiplier effect, and so supports countercyclical fiscal policy. 
                                                     
1 Throughout this paper, a procyclical fiscal policy involves higher (lower) government spending and 
lower (higher) tax rates in good (bad) times, while a countercyclical fiscal policy involves lower (higher) 
government spending and higher (lower) tax rates in good (bad) times, in keeping with Kaminsky, 
Reinhart, and Végh (2004). 
2 It is quite difficult to consistently discuss the business cycle property of general tax rates due to data 
restrictions. However, anecdotally speaking, some governments conduct tax cuts (e.g., Japan in 1998), 
whereas other governments raise the tax rates (e.g., Argentina in the late 1990s and early 2000s) during 
recession. There are abundant examples of governments in developing countries, which increase the tax 
rates during recession. This implies that the fiscal policy might be more procyclical than suggested by 
government consumption data. 
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Tax-smoothing model with distortionary tax backs up acyclical fiscal policy by asserting that the 
government should not adjust fiscal policy stance over business cycle. 
There are two classes of models in the literature that explain this puzzling procyclical 
behavior of the fiscal policy in developing countries. The first class consists of the political 
economy models represented by Talvi and Végh (2005) which owe their results to the 
asymmetric assumption that running a fiscal surplus during a boom is more costly than running a 
fiscal deficit during a period of recession because of the political pressures to increase fiscal 
spending. The second class is based on the incompleteness of the international capital market. 
Aizenman, Gavin, and Hausmann (2000) have proposed a two-period model, studying the 
patterns of the optimal tax rate and borrowing characterized by costly tax collection and 
endogenous country risk. Moreover, Riascos and Végh (2004) have argued that the puzzle can be 
explained by the exogenous market incompleteness in developing countries, assuming that G7 
countries have access to contingent bonds and developing countries have access to only 
one-period, risk-free bonds. While Riascos and Végh (2004) were the first to study the 
procyclical fiscal policy in developing countries by applying a dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium model, their model fails to predict the greater procyclicality that private consumption 
undergoes as compared to government consumption in both developed and developing countries. 
This will be introduced in the next section. 
This paper addresses puzzling cyclical features of the fiscal policy in emerging market 
countries and their sharp contrast with those in developed countries. A dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium model is developed to study the interaction among transfer payment, 
government consumption, and sovereign borrowing with the default option by a rational and 
benevolent government. This model is an extension of Arellano (2006); it explicitly describes a 
government’s stance in determining government consumption and transfer payment over the 
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business cycle. Government consumption is defined as the sum of a public goods component that 
is directly beneficial to households and a hidden transfer payment component. These hidden 
transfers, inspired by a public project that was recently implemented in Argentina, appear in 
national accounts as government consumption, but I argue that they behave more as transfers. 
The government finds this hidden transfer payment component useful for smoothing private 
consumption as it is more flexible over the cycle than standard institutionalized transfer 
programs like social security. A benevolent government has access to the international capital 
market where it can trade one-period bonds with the default option. Since sovereign debts are not 
enforceable due to sovereign immunity and the lack of an international proxy for the domestic 
bankruptcy court, the sovereign government’s option to default on its debts plays a critical role in 
their pricing. The government, understanding the advantages and disadvantages of exercising 
this default option, decides to exercise it in optimal situations. As the utility of households is over 
private consumption and the public goods component of government consumption, equating 
these marginal utilities leads to both of them to being procyclical at equilibrium due to imperfect 
insurance under an incomplete capital market; this is analogous to the result of procyclical 
private consumption in a standard small open economy model (e.g., Mendoza (1991)). On the 
other hand, were it not for the default option, transfer payments and the hidden transfer payment 
component of government consumption should have been countercyclical, since a benevolent 
government tries to smoothen private consumption by increasing (decreasing) transfers and 
hidden transfers during a recession (boom). Nevertheless, such attempts are constrained by 
endogenous risk premia. 
I consider two models: (i) an emerging market economy, whose government has a default 
option and (ii) a developed economy, whose government can trade one-period bonds at the world 
risk-free interest rate, derived by shutting down the endogenous default option. These two 
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models are solved numerically and calibrated to two cases: the Mexican and the US economies. 
The emerging market model, when calibrated to the Mexican economy, replicates the procyclical 
features of government consumption and transfer payments, as observed in the data. On the other 
hand, the developed country model, when calibrated to the US economy, shows a countercyclical 
transfer payment that is consistent with the data for the US and other developed countries. The 
default option is shown to be the key driver for the asymmetries observed in the data, suggesting 
that sovereign default has significant effects on risk sharing and the behavior of the fiscal policy. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the 
business cycle properties of government consumption and transfer payments for both developed 
and emerging market countries. Section 3 reviews the aims of government consumption. The 
model economy is presented in section 4, and its recursive equilibrium is discussed in section 5. 
Section 6 describes numerical solution and calibration of the model, and sections 7 and 8 discuss 
the simulation results for the cases of the Mexican and US economies. The sensitivity analyses of 
the simulation are shown in section 9. Finally, the conclusion is presented in section 10. 
 
II.2 Empirical Evidence 
This section reviews and analyzes the business cycle properties of private consumption, 
government consumption, and transfer payments in developed and developing countries. I focus 
on those volatilities that are measured by standard deviations and those comovements which are 
measured by the correlations of the Hodrick-Prescott filtered variables in accordance with the 
vast business cycle literature. I employ annual data from International Finance Statistics (IFS) 
and the World Development Indicators (WDI) for national account statistics, including GDP, 
private consumption, and government consumption. Further, I utilize data from Government 
Finance Statistics (GFS) for government expenditure statistics. The logarithm of each series are 
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ran through the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 100. The sample period is 
from 1972 to 20043. 
Table 2.1 summarizes the volatilities and correlations of the cyclical components of real 
GDP, real private consumption, and real government consumption in OECD and developing 
countries4. In developing and emerging market countries, national account statistics are more 
volatile than in OECD countries; further, such tendencies are clearer for government 
consumption than private consumption. While real GDP is 3.0 (2.5) times more volatile in 
developing countries (emerging market countries) than in G7 countries, real private consumption 
and government consumption are 3.9 (2.9) times and 4.5 (3.8) times more volatile in developing 
countries (emerging market countries) than in G7 countries on average, respectively. Further, 
while real private consumption and government consumption are only 7% and 28% more volatile 
than real GDP in OECD countries, respectively, they are 55% (30%) and 164% (143%) more 
volatile in developing countries (emerging market countries). Higher relative fluctuations in real 
private consumption vis-à-vis real GDP suggest a failure of consumption risk sharing in 
developing and emerging market countries. Moreover, sharp fluctuations in government 
consumption in developing countries and emerging market countries imply that these 
governments are not endowed with steady revenue sources and are subject to major obstacles and 
constraints in balancing government purchases over the business cycle. 
With regard to cyclicality, while the correlation between real GDP and private 
consumption is positive in OECD countries (0.76), developing countries (0.58), and emerging 
market countries (0.64), the correlation between real GDP and government consumption shows a 
striking contrast across country categories. While government consumption is acyclical in G7 
                                                     
3 For some countries, the sample period is shorter due to data availability. The results did not change 
drastically when I limited the sample period to after the 1990s. 
4 Individual country data are reported in the Table 2.5. 
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countries (–0.06) and less procyclical in other OECD countries (0.26), it is more 
procyclical—albeit to a lesser extent than private consumption—in developing countries (0.35) 
and emerging market countries (0.43). Further, the comparison between emerging market 
countries, which are considered to have fairly limited but more access to the international capital 
market, and other developing countries is suggestive. The correlation between government 
consumption and GDP in emerging market countries (0.43) is even higher than that in other 
developing countries (0.31). These results suggest that there is a mechanism that is peculiar to 
emerging market countries that promotes procyclical government consumption. 
Table 2.1 also shows the volatility and cyclicality of transfer payments from government 
expenditure statistics for OECD and emerging market countries5. A surprisingly interesting 
finding is the sharp contrast in the cyclicality of transfer payments between developed and 
emerging market countries. As generally expected, current transfers are countercyclical in 
developed countries (average correlation with GDP is –0.21 in G7 countries and –0.17 in other 
OECD countries). Moreover, transfers to households, which are one item of current transfers, are 
more countercyclical (average correlation with GDP is –0.51 in G7 countries and –0.25 in other 
OECD countries). On the other hand, these items are procyclical in emerging market countries, 
as shown by their correlations with GDP of 0.20 and 0.30, respectively. These findings are 
particularly striking since transfer payments should naturally expand during recession when a 
greater percentage of the population experiences financial difficulties. Transfer payments are also 
                                                     
5 Tables 2.6.a and 2.6.b report all the statistics of government expenditure for individual countries. 
Statistics for developed countries are consistent with Lane (2003), which studies the cyclical behavior of 
the fiscal policy in OECD countries. It should be noted that, apart from the methodological difference in 
collecting national account statistics and government finance statistics, government expenditure is broader 
than government consumption in that it includes transfer payments, interest payments, and other spending 
items. While the expenditure on goods and services is acyclical in developed countries (correlation with 
GDP is 0.02 in OECD countries), it is procyclical in emerging market countries (correlation with GDP is 
0.42); these observations are consistent with the business cycle properties found by the national account 
statistics (Table 2.1). 
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far more volatile in emerging market countries than in OECD countries, and their relative 
volatility vis-à-vis GDP is much higher in emerging market countries than in OECD countries. 
These sharp differences might imply that emerging market countries are subject to tight fiscal 
budget constraints during recession when the governments otherwise would have wanted to pay 
out more transfer payments. 
Next, I empirically explore the creditworthiness premium on the cyclicality of 
government consumption. One of the important barriers separating OECD countries from 
emerging market and other developing countries is the recognition in the market, which is 
embodied as creditworthiness. Therefore, I use information on sovereign debt ratings to see if it 
is true that government consumption is sensitive to those ratings. As for sovereign debt ratings, I 
employ foreign currency long-term sovereign ratings history assigned by Standard & Poor’s. 
First, I estimate the effects of improvement in the creditworthiness on the cyclicality of 
government consumption. I specifically estimate that 
  (1) i,t 0 1 i,t 2 i,t 3 i,t i,t
4 t i,t
GC GDP RATING (GDP *RATING )
COMMODITY PRICE u ,
= α + α + α + α
+ α +
where GC, GDP, and COMMODITY PRICE denote the real government consumption, real GDP, 
and prices of petroleum and wheat6, respectively. The subscripts i and t denote the country and 
year, respectively. I assign numerical values for RATING—twenty-one integers as RATING with 
a higher number for better creditworthiness (i.e., AAA = 20, AA += 19,..., SD = 0), as the ratings 
of Standard & Poor’s are ranked in twenty-one categories from AAA to SD (selected default). 
Table 2.2 reports the estimates of OLS, the random effects model, and the fixed effects model. 
The results indicate that countries tend to spend less procyclically on government consumption 
                                                     
6 Two kinds of commodity prices are included as exogenous control variables, since those prices 
potentially affect government expenditure size as well as GDP. The regression results are robust with or 
without these commodity prices. 
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with an improvement in creditworthiness, as shown by the significantly negative α3. 
I then estimate the following equation, which allows the cyclicality of government 
consumption to differ among the rating categories, 
  (2) i,t 0 1 i,t 2 i,t
3 i,t i,t 4 t i,t
GC GDP RATING DUMMY
(GDP * RATING DUMMY ) COMMODITY PRICE v ,
=β + β + β
+ β + β +
where RATINGDUMMY denotes eight dummy variables for each of the rating categories (i.e., 
AAA, AA,..., SD).7 The estimates of OLS, the random effects model, and the fixed effects model 
in Table 2.2 show that a country tends to spend more procyclically on government consumption 
with deteriorations of its creditworthiness, while countries with the highest ratings (i.e., AAA and 
AA) record acyclical government consumption. The estimated creditworthiness premia on the 
cyclicality of government consumption (β3s) are monotonically larger for lower rating categories 
for the most part. Furthermore, the estimated creditworthiness premium for default countries, 
which are naturally considered to be excluded from the international capital market, is much 
lower than the premia for low ratings such as CC, CCC, and B. This might suggest that if there is 
no substantial and systematic difference in the levels of political distortion between the default 
countries and the countries with the lowest ratings, the accessibility to the international capital 
market plays an important role in explaining the procyclical fiscal policy of emerging market 
countries. 
The empirical findings, which I will explain by the model and simulations in subsequent 
sections, can be summarized by the following four stylized facts. 
Stylized Fact #1: Government consumption is extremely volatile when compared with GDP and 
private consumption in developing and emerging market countries, which is not necessarily the 
case in developed countries. 
                                                     
7 AAA is the default category. 
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Stylized Fact #2: Government consumption is procyclical in developing and emerging market 
countries, while it is acyclical or less procyclical in developed countries. 
Stylized Fact #3: Government consumption is less procyclical than private consumption in 
developing and emerging market countries. 
Stylized Fact #4: Transfer payments tend to be highly volatile and procyclical in emerging 
market countries, while they are countercyclical in developed countries. 
 
II.3 Government Consumption Revisited 
In this section, I review the characteristics of government consumption and argue that it 
has two components that do not have the same aims, and may thus behave differently over the 
business cycle. Those components are the important elements of the model economy introduced 
in next section. 
In the standard system of national accounts (SNA) statistics, government final 
consumption expenditure is defined as all government current expenditures for the purchases of 
goods and services, including compensation for employees. Thus, it excludes transfer payments 
such as social security payments and unemployment benefits, which are all counted as minus tax. 
For example, government consumption covers broad areas of public goods such as defense, 
security service, judicial system, roadways, and education. The question then is how can I 
understand the benefits of those public goods for households and the government’s motivation to 
provide them by fiscal spending? The most natural and direct explanation is that they are 
preferred by households and thus increase public utility. The government provides them, rather 
than allowing them to be privately provided through market mechanisms, due to their so-called 
non-preclusion and/or non-rivalrousness characteristics. 
In addition, economists have pointed out another potential motivation for the government 
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to consume goods and services; this dates back to Keynes’s famous metaphor known as 
“hole-digging-filling.” 
If the Treasury were to fill old bottles with banknotes, bury them at suitable depths in 
disused coalmines which are then filled up to the surface with town rubbish, and leave it to 
private enterprises on well-tried principles of laissez-faire to dig the notes up again (the right to 
do so being obtained, of course, by tendering for leases of the note-bearing territory), there need 
be no more unemployment and, with the help of the repercussions, the real income of the 
community, and its capital wealth also, would probably become a good deal greater than it 
actually is. It would, indeed, be more sensible to build houses and the like; but, if there are 
political and practical difficulties in the way of this, the above would be better than nothing. 
This metaphor argues that during recession, government spending might be beneficial to 
the economy through the multiplier effect, even if the goods and services purchased are not 
directly preferred by households. It would, of course, be advisable for the government to spend 
wisely on goods and services that are more preferred by households than less preferred. However, 
as is often the case, political, social, and practical reasons prevent the government from doing so. 
In this case, the government may rationally spend on less preferred goods and services as the 
second best option. 
Furthermore, a public project recently implemented in Argentina shows a related but 
slightly different motivation for the government to spend on government consumption. The 
Argentine government launched the Head of Household Project in 2002 as a measure to alleviate 
the impact of increasing unemployment due to a severe economic crisis. A stipend of 150 
Argentine pesos8 per month is provided to the unemployed heads of households in exchange for 
participating in four hours of work in community services, minor construction, repair, expansion, 
maintenance or remodeling of schools, health facilities, basic sanitation facilities, small roads 
and bridges, culverts and canals, community kitchens and centers, tourist centers, low-cost 
                                                     
8 This is approximately US $50 from the nominal exchange rate at that time. 
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housing, and, on a pilot basis, some productive activities. While the services provided in this 
project seem to be useful, the jobs would not have been offered if the country was not faced with 
a severe economic crisis and the resultant high unemployment. The primary purpose of providing 
these services or purchase of labor is then a social safety net, and the direct benefits for 
households’ utility or producers’ convenience are only of secondary importance. 
This discussion justifies my claim that government consumption can be defined as the 
sum of (i) a public goods component that is directly beneficial to households and (ii) a hidden 
transfer payment component that is less or not beneficial to households, but provided as a social 
safety net. These hidden transfers appear in national accounts as government consumption, but I 
argue that they behave more as transfers in that they induce private consumption by relaxing 
household budget constraints. The government finds this hidden transfer payment component of 
government consumption useful for smoothing private consumption as they are more flexible 
over the cycle than standard, institutionalized transfer programs such as social security, which is 
counted as a transfer payment. While huge efforts are required to alter the transfer payment 
schemes due to political, legislative, and other institutional reasons, the government may be able 
to discretionarily adjust government consumption over the business cycle. 
 
II.4 The Model Economy 
I consider a benevolent sovereign government’s problem in a small open endowment 
economy. The sovereign government has access to the international capital market where it can 
buy and sell one-period discount bonds at contingent prices with the default option. The 
risk-neutral competitive foreign creditors take into account how likely it is that this option will 
be exercised when creditors offer discounted prices of bonds. When the sovereign government 
exercises the default option, the international capital market penalizes it by temporally excluding 
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it from any transactions. The economy also temporally loses a fixed proportion of endowments 
after the default. This can be justified by several channels, including the disruption of the local 
banking system, which often has a large exposure to government bonds, and an adverse impact 
on international arrangements such as trade linkage after default (Rose (2005)). On the other 
hand, households do not have access to the international capital market in this model economy. 
This appears to be too strong an assumption considering the fact that many local banks and firms 
recently succeeded in raising funds in the international capital market. However, it will be more 
convincing when I think of the fact that credit ratings for firms and households in emerging 
markets tend to be constrained by the sovereign ceiling. Thus, their funding costs are higher than 
the interest rate charged on the sovereign government in most of the cases in emerging market 
countries. 
In this model, government expenditure is defined in simple and general terms as 
constituting government consumption (g) and transfer payments (eTR). Further, government 
consumption is defined as a public goods component (gPG) and a hidden transfer payment 
component (gTR), following the discussion in section 3. While this public goods component is 
directly beneficial to the households’ welfare, the hidden transfer payment component does not 
directly affect the households’ welfare. Nevertheless, the government has an incentive to provide 
these hidden transfer payments particularly during recession, since it is useful as a social safety 
net relaxing the budget constraint of households. In this sense, the hidden transfer payment 
component behaves more as transfer payments. The government finds this hidden transfer 
payment component of government consumption useful as it is flexible over the cycle, while the 
government is subject to legislative, institutional, practical, and other frictions when it attempts 
to adjust transfer payment schemes. 
The government is rational and benevolent in this model economy. Therefore, it 
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optimally decides whether to repay or default on debts, taking into consideration the advantages 
and disadvantages of exercising the default option, chooses an asset position in the international 
capital market, and then determines the levels of transfer payments, the public goods component, 
and the hidden transfer payment component of government consumption for each period, in 
order to maximize social utility. 
Households are identical and their preferences are over private consumption and the 
public goods component of government consumption. The expected infinite lifetime social utility 
is given by 
  (3) t P0 t
t 0





where 0 < β < 1 is the period discount factor, ct and denote the aggregate private 
consumption and the public goods component of government consumption in period t, 
respectively, and u(·) is the period utility function that is strictly concave and increasing and 
satisfies the Inada conditions. Every period, households receive an endowment of single 
nonstorable goods. The endowed income at period t (y
PG
tg
t) is stochastic, drawn from a compact set 
Y conditionally on the previous period realization (yt–1) with a probability distribution function 
f(yt|yt–1), following the Markov process. A time invariant income tax rate (τ) is levied on the 
endowment, and households receive transfer payments and the hidden transfer payment 
component of government consumption in a lump sum manner that relaxes the budget constraint 
of the households. Thus, the aggregated budget constraint of the households is given by 
  (4) TR TRt t tc (1 )y e g≤ − τ + +
and the equality always holds in optimal conditions. The amount of private consumption (ct) is 
determined passively for households by the realized endowment shock and the government’s 
decision on transfer payments and hidden transfer payments. 
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The sovereign government, not the households, conducts business transactions with 
creditors in the international capital market. The international capital market is incomplete in the 
sense that the sovereign government and creditors trade only one-period discount bonds at an 
endogenous contingent price (q). The creditors are risk neutral and behave competitively with 
perfect information on the economy’s endowment and asset position. The creditors are not 
subject to any funding constraints, and thus, they lend and borrow as much as necessary at the 
world risk-free interest rate (r). The sovereign government has an option to default on the 
contract9 when the asset position is negative (i.e., the sovereign government borrows in the 
international capital market). The decision to repay or default is endogenously made as the 
optimal choice by the sovereign government based on the information pertaining to endowment 
shock, current asset position, and the pluses and minuses of default. Thus, the expected default 
probability in the next period (δ) depends on the asset position in the next period (B′) and the 
current endowment shock that holds information on the endowment shock in the next period (δ = 
δ(y, B′)). For an arbitrary level of the asset position of the sovereign government in the next 
period, the zero profit condition of the competitive creditors, who regard the discount price of 
bonds and default probability given, implies 
 1qB B 0.
1 r
− δ′ ′φ = − =
+
 (5) 
For a negative asset position (B′ < 0), the creditors are subject to a potentially positive 
endogenous default risk. Since the creditors take into account this default risk when they offer 
the price of discount bonds, this also depends both on the endowment shock and on the size of 
the bonds being issued (q = q(y, B′)). Thus, the zero profit condition is reduced to 





                                                     
9 The option of partial payment is excluded. 
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For the positive asset position (B′ ≥ 0), the probability of the default is zero10, and thus, the price 






1 ). Since 0 ≤ δ ≤ 
1, the zero profit condition implies that the bond prices lie in the closed interval [0, (1 + r)–1]. The 
country-specific interest rate that the sovereign government faces in the international capital 
market (rc) is expressed as 
 c







When the sovereign government defaults on the contract, the existing debts are wiped out 
and the government loses access to the international capital market for a stochastic number of 
periods. During this penalty phase, contrary to the normal phase, the economy is in financial 
autarky, and the government loses the opportunities to conduct intertemporal saving and 
dissaving and also suffers from a reduction of endowment by a fixed proportion (λ ≤ 1). The 
sovereign government has an exogenous constant probability (θ) to re-enter the international 
capital market while it is in the penalty phase. 
The government’s objective is to maximize the expected infinite lifetime social utility. 
The sovereign government can buy and sell one-period bonds at contingent prices in the 
international capital market, by which it tries to conduct optimal intertemporal saving and 
dissaving for the economy. Since sovereign debts are not enforceable, the sovereign government 
makes a decision regarding whether to repay the existing debts or default when the existing asset 
position is negative, based on the existing asset position, realized endowment shock, and 
advantages and disadvantages of defaulting. Furthermore, the sovereign government determines 
a new asset position (B′) when it decides not to default, and hence continues to have access to the 
international capital market. The government also levies a time invariant tax rate (τ) on the 
                                                     
10 The competitive creditors are assumed to always obey the contracts.  
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endowment, and tax revenue minus net payment to the creditors will be spent on transfer 
payments to households (eTR) and government consumption (g). Government consumption is 
defined as the sum of (i) a public goods component (gPG) that is directly beneficial to households’ 
welfare and (ii) a hidden transfer payment component (gTR) that is not directly beneficial to 
households’ welfare, but provided as a social safety net. The government has the authority to 
determine the amount of budgetary resources that will be allocated to transfer payments, the 
public goods component, and the hidden transfer payment component of government 
consumption. Since the sovereign government can be involved in the intertemporal saving and 
borrowing in the international capital market during the normal phase, it tries to smooth private 
consumption and the public goods component of government consumption by optimally 
choosing the asset position in the next period, transfer payments, and the hidden transfer 
payment component of government consumption. However, attempts at consumption smoothness 
are constrained by the market incompleteness, particularly the endogenous risk premium derived 
from the default option. 
 
II.5 Recursive Equilibrium 
In this section, I define and characterize recursive equilibrium. For any given state 
characterized by the current existing asset position and realized endowment shock (s = (B, y)), 
the policy function of the government (B′, eTR, gPG, gTR, and decisions on repaying and 
defaulting), the price function for bonds (q), and the policy function of households (c) jointly and 
recursively determine the equilibrium. 
The households’ problem is static. Each period they are informed of their period budget 
constraint, observing the realized endowment shock (yt), transfer payments to households (eTR), 
and the hidden transfer payment component of government consumption (gTR), the households 
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optimally spend all their resources as private consumption (c), since the single good of this 
economy is nonstorable. It should be noted that households do not have access to the 
international capital market and thus cannot save or dissave intertemporally. 
Foreign creditors are assumed to be risk neutral and competitive with complete 
information on the endowment shock and size of the bonds offered by the sovereign government. 
The creditors buy and sell as many bonds as requested by the sovereign government as long as 
the expected gross return in the next period is equal to 1 + r, where r is the exogenously given 
risk-free world interest rate. Therefore, they always meet the demand for bonds by the sovereign 
government at the price of 





The sovereign government is benevolent in that its objective is to maximize the expected 
infinite lifetime social utility. For this objective, given the values of the asset position carried 
over from the previous period and the realized endowment shock, the government decides 
whether to follow the contracts with the creditors or default, chooses an asset position in the next 
period taking the bond price schedule given in the normal phase, and then determines the transfer 
payments, public goods component, and hidden transfer payment component of the government 
consumption for every period. With regard to the choice between transfer payments and hidden 
transfer payments, whose aims are compatible, I impose an exogenous restriction 
( TR TR1g −ω=
ω
e
                                                     
) for simplicity11. When the sovereign government decides to default, all the 
existing debts are wiped out, thereby exempting the government from repaying the debts. In 
return, the government will be in the penalty phase, during which it is not allowed to access the 
11 Considering that the hidden transfer payment component of government consumption is potentially 
more flexible than transfer payments by nature, as discussed in section 3, it would have been more 
appropriate to model it such that hidden transfer payments record more volatility and countercyclicality. 
However, I choose this simple restriction to avoid imposing an arbitrary restriction. 
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international capital market and also suffers from a reduction in endowment of a fixed proportion 
(λ) for stochastic periods. In this penalty phase, the government optimally determines transfer 
payments, the public goods component, and the hidden transfer payment component of 





with the endowment shock. The probability of moving back to the normal phase and restoring its 
access to the international capital market over the next period is, for the sovereign government, 
exogenously fixed to θ (≥0). 
When the sovereign government is in the normal phase, the budgetary source of 
providing transfer payments and government consumption is two-fold, namely, the imposition of 
a time-invariant tax rate on endowment and borrowing from foreign creditors. I assume that only 
the government can transform one unit of endowment into one unit of public goods without 
incurring any costs. Then, the budget constraints of households and the government at period t in 
the normal phase are 
  (9) TR TRt t t t(1 )y + e g c      (households)− + ≥τ
  (10) TR PG TRt t t t t t 1 t t 1y   e g g B q(B , y )B   (government);+ +τ ≥ + + − +
therefore, the resource constraint of the economy in the normal phase is 
  (11) PGt t t t t+1 t t+1y   c + g B + q(B ,y )B  .≥ −
To exclude the possibility of a negative value of a hidden transfer payment component of 
government consumption, I also state the following condition 
  (12) TRtg ≥
When the government is in the penalty phase, it does not have access to the international 
capital market. Therefore, the budgetary source of providing transfer payments and government 
consumption is only the imposition of a time-invariant tax rate on endowment that is reduced by 
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a fixed proportion (λ). Thus, the budget constraint of households and the government at period t 
in the penalty phase is 
  (13) TR TRt t t t(1 )(1 )y e g   c      (households)− τ − λ + + ≥
  (14) TR PG TRt t t t(1 )y e + g + g   (government);− ≥τ λ
and then, the resource constraint of the economy in the penalty phase is 
  (15) PGt t t(1 )y  c g .− λ ≥ +
As is the case in the normal phase, the non-negative hidden transfer payment component 
condition is given as 
  (16) TRtg ≥0.
0
For a given level of the existing asset position and endowment shock in this period, 
equating the marginal utilities of private consumption and the public goods component of 
government consumption pins down the optimal set of private consumption and public goods 
component ( ) for each arbitrary level of the asset position in the next period. In other 
words, I have 
* PG*
t tc , g
  (17) * PG * * PG *1 t t 2 t tu (c , g ) u (c , g )=
where and satisfy *tc
PG *
tg
  (18) * PG *t t t t t 1c g y B qB  (in the normal phase)++ = + −
  (19) * PG *t t tc g (1 )y (in the penalty phase).+ = − λ
Note that for a low tax rate (τ) relative to the volatility of the endowment shock, the government 
may find it optimal to set the sum of transfer payments and hidden transfer payments at a 
negative value. It might also be optimal for the government to save in the international capital 
market when an extremely good shock hits the economy. Subsequently, the government chooses 
a zero hidden transfer component of government consumption ( TR *tg = ) and negative transfer 




Let v0(B, y) be the value function of the government for a given state s = (B, y) in the 
normal phase. Each period the government decides whether to follow the contracts or to renege 
on the debt after being informed of the current state. Then, the function v0(B,y) satisfies the 
condition 
  (20) 0 cv (B, y) = max {v (B, y), v (y)}d
where vc(B, y) denotes the value function when the government decides to follow the contracts, 
and vd(y) denotes the value function when it decides to default on debts. The value of obeying 
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The value of default is expressed as 
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Since the objective of the sovereign government is to maximize the expected infinite 
lifetime social utility, it tries to maintain the smoothness of the private consumption and the 
public goods component of government consumption by borrowing during recessions and saving 
during booms. If the international capital market were complete, consumption would be perfectly 
smoothed, and transfer payments and hidden transfer payments would be countercyclical. 
However, such an attempt is severely constrained by the endogenous risk premia derived from 
the default option. The more the endogenous default risk premia prevents the sovereign 
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government from borrowing when a bad shock hits the economy, the less successful is the 
government in smoothing private consumption and the public goods component, and the less 
countercyclical are the transfer payments and the hidden transfer payment component. When the 
size and procyclicality of the public goods component are larger and greater than being offset by 
the size and countercyclicality of hidden transfer payments, government consumption—defined 
as the sum of these two components—is procyclical, but less so than private consumption. This 
is also true when even hidden transfer payments are procyclical, albeit less so than the public 
goods component. 
 
II.6 Numerical Solution and Calibration 
The model is solved numerically in order to quantitatively evaluate its prediction for the 
cyclical properties of transfer payments and government consumption. The point to be focused 
on is whether endogenous risk premia on sovereign borrowing derived from the default option 
can explain the observed sharp contrasts in the cyclicalities of government consumption and 
transfer payments in the emerging market and developed countries. For this purpose, I consider 
two models: (i) the emerging market country model, whose government has the default option 
and (ii) the developed country model, whose government can trade one-period bonds at the 
world risk-free interest rate12 derived by shutting down the endogenous default option. These two 
models are solved numerically and calibrated to two cases: the Mexican and the US economies. 
The emerging market country model is solved by the value function iteration method that 
allows for the endogeneity of the bond price vector. More specifically, the income space and 
asset space are discretized and the initial guess for the bond prices (q0) is set to the one 
                                                     
12 In order to rule out the Ponzi scheme, I impose minimum convex portfolio adjustment costs in the 
quadratic form for nonzero net asset positions (See Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003)). 
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associated with the risk-free world interest rate for all the states. Then, the value function of 
obeying the contracts (vc) and defaulting on the debts (vd) are computed, and thus the value 
function in the normal phase is found to be v0 = max(vc,vd). This also indicates the expected 
default probability during the next period in each state, and hence, the zero profit condition of the 
creditors will generate an equilibrium state contingent bond price vector (q1). Then, q0 is updated 
to q1 and the process is repeated until the convergence criterion is met. 
In the numerical solutions, the standard constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) 












where xt is the consumption aggregator of private consumption, and the public goods component 
of government consumption is defined as 
 PG (1 )t t tx (c ) (g ) .
α −α=  (24) 
The Cobb-Douglas specification is chosen for the substitution between the private consumption 
and a public goods component, since the fraction of the total consumption that is allocated for 
private consumption remains stable over time in the data. These functional forms of the utility of 
households guarantee that * PG *t tcov(c ,g ) 1=  always holds at equilibrium. 
The parameters of the two cases are summarized in Table 2.3. They are either calibrated 
to the Mexican and US economies or set in accordance with relevant previous literature. It 
should be noted that the income loss during the penalty phase and the probability of re-entry into 
the market are not applicable to the developed country model, in which the sovereign 
government’s default option has been canceled to ensure that it can always save and dissave at 
the risk-free world interest rate. With regard to the stochastic income process, I consider a 
transitory shock to income represented by the AR(1) income process, which is standard in the 
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literature. The AR(1) coefficient is estimated based on the following specification: 
 




where ~ N(0, ),
− t=µ +ρ − µ + ε
ε σ
 (25) 
based on the Mexican logarithmic real GDP data (ρy = 0.955)13. The standard deviation of 
innovation in the income process is calibrated such that the Hodrick-Prescott filtered income 
volatility derived in the simulation approximately matches the standard deviations of the cyclical 
component of the real GDP in Mexico and US reported in Table 2.1 (σy = 3.52 for the Mexican 
economy case and σy = 2.00 for the US economy case). The time-invariant income tax rate (τ) is 
set to 0.231 for the Mexican economy case and 0.294 for the US economy case in order to match 
the average public sector revenue GDP ratio in the data taken from government statistics of those 
countries. The world risk-free interest rate is chosen as 0.04 (4%), which is analogous to the US 
annual real interest rate, that is standard in the previous literature (e.g., Mendoza (1991)). The 
income loss during the penalty phase (λ) is set at 0.02 (2%) following Chuhan and Sturzenegger 
(2003), who estimate the impact of the default decision on growth and income in the succeeding 
years. The probability of re-entry into the international capital market during the penalty phase 
after exercising a default option (θ) is set as 0.22, which implies that the sovereign government is 
expected to be excluded from market access for 4.5 years. This is consistent with the average 
number of years required until resumption after default in the 1980s and 1990s reported in Gelos, 
Sahay, and Sandleris (2004)14. The relative risk aversion (γ) of 2.0 is a standard value in the real 
business cycle literature. The time preference discount factor (β) is set to 0.955, which is 
                                                     
13 The estimate for US data also shows a highly persistent AR(1) coefficient, the value of which is close to 
that of Mexico. 
14 Here, access is defined as the issuance of public or publicly guaranteed bonds or syndicated loans. 
Further, the year of default is defined as the year in which the sovereign government defaulted on 
foreign-currency debts according to Standard & Poor’s. This default definition is a broad one (i.e., defaults 
on interest payments only, and so-called strategic defaults are often counted as sovereign defaults) and 
may result in a downward bias in the estimation of the probability of re-entry. A substantial number of 
default countries in their sample have gained re-access to the market within a year. 
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equivalent to 0.989 in the quarterly base calibration. This value is slightly lower than that in 
standard real business cycle literature (e.g., Buckus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992)) and that 
implied by the real interest rate ( 1
1 r+
); however, this value is much higher than that adopted in 
related literature such as Arellano (2005) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2006). I need impatient 
households in order to ensure that the government borrows in average at equilibrium without 
building buffer stocks. The weight on private consumption in the Cobb-Douglas consumption 
aggregator (α) is calibrated to 0.9 for both cases so that the simulation result of the average 
private consumption-income ratio (c/y) matches the ratio of the sum of private consumption and 
private investment to the GDP for Mexico (0.90) and the US (0.85). Moreover, the parameter 
regarding exogenous restriction on transfer payments and hidden transfer payments (ω) is 
calibrated to 0.39 for the case of the Mexican economy and 0.68 for that of the US economy so 
that the transfer payment income ratio (eTR/y) derived in simulations matches the ratio of current 
transfer (subsidies and other current transfer) to the GDP observed in the Mexican (0.05) and US 
(0.12) data. 
 
II.7 Simulation: Mexican Economy Case 
The results of the simulation, shown in Table 2.4.a (Mexican Economy Case), are the 
average of 1,000 simulations each for a length of 100 periods15. I simulate both the emerging 
market country model, whose government has a default option, and the developed country model, 
whose government can trade one-period bonds at the world risk-free interest rate without the 
default option. The simulated data are treated consistently with the data. Since the emerging 
market country model does not predict the price of the bonds during the periods in the penalty 
                                                     
15 In order to rule out any effect of the initial values (income and asset position), I simulated the model for 
1,100 periods and extracted the last 100 periods in each of the runs. 
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phase, the standard deviation of the spread is computed for periods excluding those periods. 
The emerging market country model, when calibrated to the Mexican economy, succeeds 
in replicating the observed cyclical pattern of government consumption and transfer payments 
(Table 2.4.a). Although defaulting is a rare event that occurs only 0.01 times every 100 years, 
endogenous default premia deeply affect the equilibrium, particularly the cyclical patterns of 
transfer payments (correl(y,eTR)), the hidden transfer payment component of government 
consumption (correl(y, gTR)), and therefore, the government consumption (correl(y,g)), which are 
the main points of focus in this quantitative analysis. 
As is the case with a standard small open economy model without endogenous risk 
premia (e.g., Mendoza (1991)), private consumption is highly procyclical in this model, as 
indicated by a positive and close to unity correlation between the income and private 
consumption (correl(y,c) = 0.99). With regard to government consumption, the correlation 
between the income and the public goods component is in complete concord with that of private 
consumption (correl(y,gPG) = correl(y,c) = 0.99), consistent with the analysis in section 6. The 
correlation between the income and the hidden transfer payment component is positive, albeit 
smaller than that between the income and the public goods component (correl(y,gPG) = 0.99 > 
correl(y,gTR) = 0.52 > 0). This generates a positive but lower correlation between income and 
government consumption as compared to that between income and private consumption 
(correl(y,c) = 0.99 > correl(y,g) = 0.88 > 0), as observed in the data. Moreover, the correlation 
between income and transfer payments is positive and identical to that between income and a 
hidden transfer payment component (correl(y,eTR) = correl(y,gTR) = 0.52). On the whole, the 
simulation results of the emerging market country model with endogenous default premia 
succeed in replicating the observed cyclical patterns of government consumption and transfer 
payments in Mexico and other emerging market countries. 
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The main anomaly in the simulation results is the volatilities of transfer payments and 
government consumption, which are due to very small standard deviation of the spread. The 
simulation results (std(gTR) = 3.38 and std(g) = 3.04) fail to reproduce the observed high 
volatilities of transfer payments and government consumption. This is because the sovereign 
government is less involved in risky borrowing with a positive default probability in the next 
period. As shown in Figure 2.1, the bond price schedule (q(y, B ), B )′ ′ is steep near the 
thresholds for risky borrowing. Therefore, the sovereign government faces a much higher risk 
premia when it borrows more beyond these thresholds, deterring an involvement in risky 
borrowings in the equilibrium condition. This leads to less volatile and presumably more 
procyclical transfer payments and government consumption than the data. 
It is noteworthy that the procyclicalities of transfer payments and hidden transfer 
payments are derived from the fact that borrowing for consumption smoothness is severely 
constrained by endogenous default risk premia. Were it not for the default option and associated 
risk premia, the sovereign government would have wanted to borrow and transfer more when an 
adverse income shock was realized. However, the option to default implies that creditors require 
higher risk premia when the sovereign government experiences a sequence of negative shocks 
and accumulates debt. This is particularly true when the penalties for the default are relatively 
small and so the sovereign government has more incentive to default16. As a result, risk sharing 
and intertemporal consumption smoothing are substantially deterred. To support this point, I 
simulate the developed country model without the default option calibrating to the Mexican 
economy as a case study. The simulation results for this case study are in sharp contrast with 
those of the emerging market country model, in that they reveal countercyclical transfer 
payments and acyclical government consumption. The cyclical features of the fiscal policy in the 
                                                     
16 This point will be discussed in detail in section II.9. 
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simulation result of the developed country model are not compatible with those observed in the 
data for Mexico and other emerging market countries. They rather resemble the data for the US 
and other developed countries, except for higher volatilities of macro variables, which stems 
from a more volatile income process. 
 
II.8 Simulation: US Economy Case 
Table 2.4.b shows the simulation results of both the developed country model and the 
emerging market country model for the case that is calibrated to the US economy. I follow the 
same procedure and method as that used in the case of the Mexican economy; the only difference 
can be found in the setting of the parameters. The developed country model, in which the 
sovereign government has access to one-period bonds at the constant world risk-free real interest 
rate, shows clear differences with respect to the emerging market country model. 
The developed country model succeeds in predicting the countercyclical transfer 
payments (correl(y,eTR) = –0.73), as observed in the data for the US and other developed 
countries. The simulation results indicate highly countercyclical transfer payments as compared 
with the data for current transfers in the US and other developed countries. One factor explaining 
this over-prediction of countercyclicality of transfer payments is the frictionless access to the 
international capital market, which might not be the case in practice. Another potential factor 
affecting the over-prediction of countercyclical transfer payments is that the model is not 
equipped with friction for adjusting transfer payments. As discussed in section 3, the government 
may find it easier to adjust the hidden transfer payment component of government consumption 
over the business cycle in practice, given the institutional burden of altering the institutionalized 
transfer payments scheme, which might make transfer payments less countercyclical in the data. 
Moreover, it is more suitable to compare the simulation results to the data of the transfer to 
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households, whose values are closer to the simulation results for the case of the US (Table 2.1). 
Although the transfer to households is a major component of current transfer, it includes other 
items such as transfer to other levels of national government, which is not necessarily 
appropriate for modeling as transfer payments. 
One anomaly in the simulation result of this developed country model, when calibrated to 
the US economy, is that it generates a highly procyclical government consumption (correl(y,g) = 
0.86). While the simulation results show government consumption as being less procyclical than 
private consumption (correl(y,c) = 0.99), the data indicates a much smaller procyclicality in the 
US and other developed countries. One reason for this drawback is that the size of the hidden 
transfer payment component is relatively small when these parameter settings are calibrated to 
the US economy. The government spends large part of money for the social safety net needs as 
transfer payment, and little is left for hidden transfer payment component. Moreover, the second 
factor for the over-prediction of countercyclicality of transfer payments is also relevant here. If 
the government faces some friction in adjusting transfer payments, it might want to utilize 
hidden transfers more frequently in the business cycle. However, the model is not equipped with 
such friction for the sake of simplicity. This is the reason why the simulation results represent 
highly countercyclical transfer payments and highly procyclical government consumption for the 
case calibrated to the US economy. 
The sharp differences between the developed country model and the emerging market 
country model, when both of the models are calibrated to the US economy, highlight the fact that 
it is the default option, and not the volatile income process, which results in procyclical transfer 
payments. When calibrated to the US and Mexican economies, the simulation results of the 
emerging market country model show similar patterns of fiscal policy cyclicality, even though 
the Mexican case exhibits more volatilities in the macro variables derived by the higher standard 
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deviations of innovation. 
I here sum up the simulation results for two models—the emerging market country model 
and the developed country model—are discussed in sections 7 and 8. These models are calibrated 
to two cases: the Mexican and the US economies. When numerically solved and calibrated to the 
Mexican economy, the emerging market country model with a benevolent government’s default 
option on its debts succeeds in replicating the cyclical patterns of private consumption, 
government consumption, and transfer payments, while it fails to mimic the high volatilities of 
transfer payments and government consumption. Moreover, I consider the developed country 
model by shutting down the default option, in which the sovereign government has access to 
one-period bonds at the constant world risk-free real interest rate. The simulation result for this 
developed country model, when calibrated to the US economy, shows countercyclical transfer 
payments that are compatible with the data for the US and other developed countries. It is shown 
that the default option is responsible for the asymmetries observed in the data, suggesting that 
sovereign default has significant effects on risk sharing and the behavior of fiscal policy. 
 
II.9 Sensitivity Analysis 
With regard to the sensitivity analyses, I change certain parameters such as risk aversion, 
probability of re-entry into the market, and output loss during the penalty phase for the Mexican 
economy case of the emerging market country model (Table 2.4.a). 
The relationship between the degree of risk averseness and accessibility to the sovereign 
borrowings, and therefore the cyclicalities of transfer payments and hidden transfer payments, 
may not be monotone. When the economy possesses higher risk averseness, the government 
values its access to the international capital market to a much greater extent; therefore, it will 
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a lesser extent. In other words, for a risk-averse economy, the government is less likely to expand 
borrowings beyond the threshold of risk-free borrowing during bad times; therefore, it is likely to 
record more procyclical transfer payments and hidden transfer payments (higher correl(y,eTR) 
and correl(y,gTR)). However, the bond price is determined endogenously in this model. The 
creditors understand that the government in a more risk-averse economy values its access to the 
international capital market to a greater extent, and is therefore willing to pay a higher cost of 
debt repayments before defaulting. Therefore, the zero profit condition leads to a broader range 
of risk-free borrowings and a flatter slope of bond price schedule, which makes it less expensive 
for the government to be involved in borrowings. Thus, the government in a more risk-averse 
economy is likely to record a higher maximum debt income ratio and less procyclical transfer 
payments and hidden transfer payments (lower correl(y,eTR) and correl(y,gTR)) due to a broader 
range of risk-free borrowings and a flatter slope of bond price schedule, ceteris paribus. These 
two contradictory effects result in a theoretical ambiguity with respect to the changes in the 
cyclicalities of transfer payments and hidden transfer payments for different parameter values of 
risk averseness. When the risk averseness is high (γ = 3.0), it is found that the threshold income 
debt ratio for risk-free borrowing with the worst income shock increases from 10.65% in the 
benchmark case to 11.18%. The implication of this result is that a higher importance of the 
international capital market due to higher risk averseness leads to a wider range of risk-free 
borrowings and flatter bond price schedules for risky borrowings, thus relaxing the borrowing 
constraint. A sovereign government succeeds in smoothing consumption to a greater degree 
through both risk-free and risky borrowings, and therefore, a slightly lower private consumption 
volatility is observed in the higher risk aversion case. Better functioning of the international 
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capital market affects the cyclical patterns of transfer payments and government consumption 
such that it generates acyclical transfer payments (correl(y,eTR) = 0.04) and less procyclical 
government consumption (correl(y,g) = 0.70). For a lower risk averseness (γ = 1.1), the results 
are the opposite in the sense that there are higher procyclicalities of transfer payments and 
government consumption with a less functioning international capital market. 
A lower probability of re-entry (θ = 0.1) and a higher output loss during the penalty phase 
(λ = 0.04) directly increase the cost of the default, allowing the sovereign government to borrow 
more on an average. The creditors, perceiving lower default incentives, offer lower risk premia 
for any arbitrary amount of debts, which leads to higher standard deviations of transfer payments 
and hidden transfer payments. However, those volatilities do not fully account for the high 
volatilities observed in the data. Moreover, better functioning of the international capital market 




This paper develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that accounts for the 
asymmetric cyclical features of the fiscal policy between developed and emerging market 
countries. The paper makes three important contributions. 
At the outset, four stylized facts regarding the volatility and cyclicality of government 
consumption and transfer payments are documented. First, government consumption is 
extremely volatile as compared to the GDP and private consumption in emerging market 
countries, which is not necessarily the case in developed countries. Second, government 
consumption is procyclical in emerging market countries, while it is acyclical or less procyclical 
in developed countries. Third, government consumption is less procyclical than private 
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consumption in emerging market countries. Fourth, transfer payments tend to be highly volatile 
and procyclical in emerging market countries, while they are countercyclical in developed 
countries. From among these findings, procyclical transfer payments in emerging market 
countries are surprising and noteworthy in view of their aims and functions. Of particular interest 
are the sharp differences in the cyclical patterns of government consumption and transfer 
payments between developed and emerging market countries. Simple regressions also support 
the impact of the creditworthiness premia on the cyclicality of the fiscal policy. 
Second, the novelty of this paper partly lies in the manner in which government 
consumption is characterized. I investigate the aims of government consumption and claim that 
government consumption can be divided into (i) a public goods component that is directly 
beneficial to households and (ii) a hidden transfer payment component that is less or not 
beneficial to households; rather, it is provided as a social safety net. These hidden transfers, 
inspired by a public project recently implemented in Argentina, appear in national accounts as 
government consumption; however, I argue that they behave more as transfers in that they induce 
private consumption by relaxing the budget constraints of households. The government finds 
these hidden transfer payments useful for smoothing private consumption since they are more 
flexible over the cycle than standard, institutionalized transfer programs like social security. 
Third, the models explain how imperfections in the international capital market, namely 
the default option, affect the fiscal policy over the business cycle. Although I do not rule out the 
validity of an explanation for procyclical fiscal policy based on political distortion, the results of 
this paper are not derived from any distorted government policies. In the model, the sovereign 
government is assumed to be rational and benevolent in the sense that its objective is to 
maximize the expected infinite lifetime of the households’ utility. I consider two models: (i) the 
emerging market country model, whose government has a default option and (ii) the developed 
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country model, whose government can trade one-period bonds at the world risk-free interest rate. 
These two models are able to replicate the differences in government consumption and transfer 
payments over the business cycle in emerging markets and developed countries. The default 
option is shown to be responsible for the asymmetries observed in the data, suggesting that 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.516 *** 1.525 *** 1.379 ***
(0.134) (0.137) (0.145)
-0.069 *** -0.072 *** -0.069 ***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
R-squared 0.154 0.140 0.044





0.281 0.322 0.376 *
(0.206) (0.209) (0.214)
0.675 *** 0.617 *** 0.542 **
(0.203) (0.207) (0.214)
0.609 *** 0.601 *** 0.605 ***
(0.183) (0.183) (0.187)








R-squared 0.163 0.164 0.082
Number of Observations 1121 1121 1121
1/ RATING is numerical values for S&P ratings in twenty one integers (i.e. AAA=20, AA+=19,..., SD=0)  
2/ RATINGDUMMY is based on S&P ratings, and AAA is the default one.
3/ *, **, *** statistically significant at 10%, 5%, 1% level.
4/ Standard Errors are in parentheses.
CCC DUMMY * GDP  (β3CCC)
AA DUMMY * GDP  (β3AA)
A DUMMY * GDP  (β3A)
BBB DUMMY * GDP  (β3BBB)
BB DUMMY * GDP  (β3BB)
Table 2.2: Estimated Creditworthiness Premia on the Cyclicality of Government Consumption
B DUMMY * GDP  (β3B)
Random Effects Fixed Effects
GDP  (β1)
GCi,t = α0 + α1GDPi,t + α2RATINGi,t + α3(GDPi,t*RATINGi,t) + α4 COMMODITY PRICEt + ui,t
GCi,t = β0 + β1GDPi,t + β2 RATINGDUMMYi,t + β3 (GDPi,t*RATINGDUMMYi,t) + β4 COMMODITY PRICEt + vi,t
SD DUMMY * GDP  (β3SD)
CC DUMMY * GDP  (β3CC)
Government Consumption (GC)
OLS Random Effects Fixed Effects
GDP (α1)










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.1: Bond Price Schedule 
 
























lowest income shock (q(min y, B(t+1)))




Country/Region (number of country) Contemporaneous Correlations Sample Period Source
Y Y, PC Y, GC PC, GC
G7 Countries (7)
Canada 2.19 2.04 (0.93) 3.87 (1.77) 0.83 -0.49 -0.36 1972-2004 IFS
France 1.44 1.43 (0.99) 1.18 (0.82) 0.86 -0.28 -0.05 1972-2003 WDI
Germany 1.87 1.98 (1.06) 1.31 (0.70) 0.85 0.26 0.35 1972-2003 WDI
Italy 1.56 1.92 (1.23) 1.67 (1.07) 0.80 0.26 0.38 1972-2003 WDI
Japan 1.92 1.97 (1.02) 4.89 (2.54) 0.64 -0.11 -0.53 1972-2004 IFS
United Kingdom 2.14 2.35 (1.10) 2.94 (1.37) 0.92 -0.20 -0.12 1972-2004 IFS
United States 1.98 1.71 (0.86) 2.00 (1.01) 0.92 0.12 0.35 1972-2004 IFS
G7 Countries Average 1.87 1.91 (1.03) 2.55 (1.33) 0.83 -0.06 0.00
Other OECD Countries (16)
Australia 1.65 0.93 (0.57) 2.73 (1.66) 0.46 -0.03 0.44 1972-2004 IFS
Austria 1.40 1.37 (0.98) 1.63 (1.16) 0.82 0.28 0.42 1972-2003 WDI
Belgium 1.55 1.63 (1.05) 1.31 (0.84) 0.78 0.26 0.44 1972-2003 WDI
Denmark 1.87 2.29 (1.23) 2.06 (1.10) 0.77 -0.11 -0.08 1972-2004 IFS
Finland 3.58 3.46 (0.97) 2.01 (0.56) 0.94 0.49 0.62 1972-2003 WDI
Greece 2.64 2.82 (1.07) 2.84 (1.07) 0.80 0.15 0.07 1972-2003 WDI
Iceland 2.80 3.96 (1.41) 3.80 (1.36) 0.78 0.74 0.58 1972-2004 IFS
Ireland 2.55 3.34 (1.31) 3.56 (1.39) 0.71 0.28 0.10 1972-2002 WDI
Luxembourg 3.34 2.14 (0.64) 2.30 (0.69) 0.59 0.54 0.69 1972-2003 WDI
Netherlands 1.72 2.43 (1.41) 1.30 (0.75) 0.88 0.18 0.33 1972-2002 WDI
New Zealand 2.40 2.40 (1.00) 4.40 (1.83) 0.72 0.28 0.34 1972-2004 IFS
Norway 1.95 3.80 (1.95) 3.46 (1.77) 0.55 0.14 0.67 1972-2004 IFS
Portugal 3.23 3.49 (1.08) 2.96 (0.92) 0.57 0.62 0.73 1972-2002 WDI
Spain 2.33 2.85 (1.22) 2.40 (1.03) 0.94 0.70 0.84 1972-2003 WDI
Sweden 1.97 2.01 (1.02) 2.50 (1.27) 0.63 -0.28 -0.20 1972-2004 IFS
Switzerland 2.12 1.10 (0.52) 5.92 (2.80) 0.74 -0.13 0.02 1972-2004 IFS
Other OECD Countries Average 2.32 2.50 (1.09) 2.82 (1.26) 0.73 0.26 0.38
Average OECD countries 2.18 2.32 (1.07) 2.74 (1.28) 0.76 0.16 0.26
East Asia (11)
Cambodia 1.94 7.05 (3.63) 27.97 (14.41) 0.29 -0.05 -0.91 1988-2004 IFS
China 3.38 3.39 (1.00) 4.93 (1.46) 0.80 0.40 0.46 1972-2003 WDI
Hong Kong, China 3.37 3.86 (1.15) 4.09 (1.21) 0.65 0.07 0.40 1972-2004 IFS
Indonesia 4.06 5.37 (1.32) 9.86 (2.43) 0.56 0.59 0.23 1972-2004 IFS
Korea, Rep. 3.27 3.76 (1.15) 4.70 (1.44) 0.57 0.20 0.31 1972-2004 IFS
Macao, China 7.35 2.05 (0.28) 6.21 (0.85) 0.14 -0.26 0.23 1982-2004 IFS
Malaysia 4.07 5.39 (1.33) 7.68 (1.89) 0.75 0.27 0.69 1972-2004 IFS
Philippines 3.97 2.70 (0.68) 8.85 (2.23) 0.79 0.76 0.53 1972-2004 IFS
Singapore 3.63 3.16 (0.87) 7.23 (1.99) 0.36 -0.12 -0.39 1972-2004 IFS
Thailand 4.91 4.22 (0.86) 5.93 (1.21) 0.94 0.35 0.45 1972-2004 IFS
Vietnam 1.52 3.14 (2.06) 8.57 (5.63) 0.72 0.90 0.64 1990-2004 IFS
East Asia Average 3.77 4.01 (1.30) 8.73 (3.16) 0.60 0.28 0.24
South Asia (7)
Bangladesh 1.32 4.36 (3.31) 16.35 (12.42) 0.20 0.02 -0.34 1972-2004 WDI
Bhutan 2.51 11.45 (4.56) 9.82 (3.91) 0.38 -0.15 -0.37 1980-2000 IFS
India 2.12 2.40 (1.13) 5.46 (2.57) 0.63 0.53 0.44 1972-2003 IFS
Nepal 1.97 1.96 (0.99) 7.15 (3.63) 0.58 0.19 -0.16 1975-2004 IFS
Pakistan 1.42 2.57 (1.81) 8.12 (5.72) 0.33 0.36 -0.32 1972-2004 IFS
Sri Lanka 2.06 2.93 (1.42) 8.28 (4.01) 0.36 0.40 0.15 1972-2004 IFS
South Asia Average 1.90 4.28 (2.20) 9.20 (5.38) 0.41 0.23 -0.10
Middle East & North Africa (15)
Algeria 2.36 4.55 (1.93) 5.80 (2.46) 0.50 0.15 0.39 1972-2004 WDI
Bahrain 4.45 11.91 (2.68) 6.93 (1.56) 0.61 0.08 0.08 1975-2004 IFS
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2.11 2.78 (1.31) 6.57 (3.11) 0.16 0.10 -0.56 1974-2003 WDI
Iran, Islamic Rep. 9.51 8.91 (0.94) 12.50 (1.31) 0.42 0.66 0.13 1972-2004 IFS
Israel 7.10 7.92 (1.12) 12.45 (1.75) 0.86 0.92 0.72 1972-2004 IFS
Jordan 6.37 8.08 (1.27) 9.89 (1.55) 0.74 0.52 0.59 1976-2004 WDI
Kuwait 11.14 19.64 (1.76) 18.60 (1.67) 0.33 0.38 0.91 1972-1989 IFS
Libya 11.59 9.28 (0.80) 19.14 (1.65) 0.40 -0.03 0.78 1972-1983 WDI
Morocco 3.25 3.05 (0.94) 10.33 (3.17) 0.62 0.50 0.12 1972-2004 IFS
Oman 6.09 22.35 (3.67) 7.70 (1.26) 0.55 0.26 0.08 1972-2003 IFS
Saudi Arabia 5.73 13.46 (2.35) 13.60 (2.37) -0.10 0.03 0.46 1972-2004 IFS
Syrian Arab Republic 6.07 8.65 (1.43) 9.66 (1.59) 0.80 0.47 -0.01 1972-2002 IFS
Tunisia 2.13 2.19 (1.03) 3.61 (1.70) 0.46 0.24 0.41 1972-2004 IFS
United Arab Emirates 12.53 8.37 (0.67) 19.38 (1.55) 0.56 0.69 0.71 1975-1989 WDI
Yemen, Rep. 2.23 6.51 (2.91) 7.44 (3.33) -0.22 -0.46 0.36 1990-2004 WDI
Middle East & North Africa Average 6.18 9.18 (1.65) 10.91 (2.00) 0.45 0.30 0.34
Pacific (2)
Fiji 21.24 22.61 (1.06) 20.56 (0.97) 0.98 0.95 0.92 1972-2001 IFS
Papua New Guinea 5.01 8.15 (1.63) 8.92 (1.78) 0.02 0.36 0.09 1973-2004 IFS
Pacific Average 13.13 15.38 (1.35) 14.74 (1.37) 0.50 0.66 0.51
PC (relative to Y) GC (relative to Y)





Country/Region (number of country) Contemporaneous Correlations Sample Period Source
Y Y, PC Y, GC PC, GC
Other Europe & Central Asia (25)
Albania 10.11 6.70 (0.66) 16.71 (1.65) 0.52 0.94 0.49 1990-2003 WDI
Armenia 16.63 11.22 (0.67) 5.33 (0.32) 0.86 0.43 0.29 1990-2004 WDI
Azerbaijan 16.50 18.89 (1.14) 6.57 (0.40) 0.97 0.84 0.76 1992-2002 WDI
Belarus 9.10 6.08 (0.67) 12.02 (1.32) 0.91 0.70 0.59 1990-2004 IFS
Bulgaria 6.44 7.26 (1.13) 12.92 (2.01) 0.86 0.69 0.71 1980-2004 WDI
Croatia 1.75 7.57 (4.33) 4.25 (2.43) -0.15 -0.24 0.05 1994-2004 IFS
Cyprus 7.05 5.90 (0.84) 6.11 (0.87) 0.86 -0.06 -0.09 1972-2004 IFS
Czech Republic 3.80 5.89 (1.55) 4.33 (1.14) 0.90 0.62 0.53 1990-2004 WDI
Estonia 8.97 10.35 (1.15) 9.16 (1.02) 0.92 0.01 -0.20 1988-2004 WDI
Georgia 3.16 9.88 (3.13) 22.55 (7.13) 0.73 0.72 0.51 1994-2003 WDI
Hungary 4.05 3.28 (0.81) 6.20 (1.53) 0.34 0.44 0.67 1972-2004 IFS
Kazakhstan 9.63 12.69 (1.32) 12.65 (1.31) 0.87 0.66 0.60 1990-2004 WDI
Kyrgyz Republic 12.25 11.26 (0.92) 14.54 (1.19) 0.85 0.97 0.89 1990-2003 WDI
Latvia 11.95 16.35 (1.37) 3.88 (0.33) 0.97 0.28 0.20 1980-2004 WDI
Lithuania 11.34 8.11 (0.71) 16.91 (1.49) 0.88 0.42 0.17 1990-2004 IFS
Macedonia, FYR 4.70 5.22 (1.11) 6.76 (1.44) 0.53 0.39 -0.04 1990-2004 WDI
Malta 4.99 4.18 (0.84) 4.78 (0.96) 0.74 0.62 0.47 1972-2004 IFS
Moldova 11.07 9.27 (0.84) 24.43 (2.21) -0.12 0.32 0.16 1992-2004 WDI
Poland 6.61 5.65 (0.85) 24.28 (3.67) 0.45 0.10 -0.13 1980-2004 IFS
Romania 6.77 7.05 (1.04) 23.62 (3.49) 0.86 -0.33 -0.22 1980-2004 IFS
Russian Federation 8.65 5.80 (0.67) 6.50 (0.75) 0.63 0.72 0.47 1990-2004 WDI
Slovak Republic 1.77 1.78 (1.00) 4.77 (2.69) 0.16 0.46 0.54 1993-2004 IFS
Slovenia 4.19 4.17 (1.00) 2.77 (0.66) 0.76 0.86 0.62 1990-2004 WDI
Turkey 3.83 4.12 (1.08) 9.65 (2.52) 0.74 0.30 0.59 1987-2004 IFS
Ukraine 12.26 11.22 (0.92) 9.06 (0.74) 0.69 0.65 0.09 1990-2004 WDI
Other Europe & Central Asia Average 7.90 8.00 (1.19) 10.83 (1.73) 0.67 0.46 0.35
Latin America & Caribbean (26)
Argentina 5.90 8.05 (1.37) 8.30 (1.41) 0.97 0.66 0.81 1993-2004 IFS
Barbados 4.14 7.47 (1.80) 9.00 (2.17) 0.75 0.03 0.18 1972-2002 IFS
Belize 6.92 7.61 (1.10) 4.49 (0.65) 0.67 0.35 0.19 1979-2004 IFS
Bolivia 3.72 5.44 (1.46) 17.79 (4.78) 0.50 0.46 0.08 1972-2004 IFS
Brazil 3.32 6.79 (2.05) 7.82 (2.36) 0.37 0.44 -0.29 1972-2004 IFS
Chile 5.92 7.75 (1.31) 7.43 (1.26) 0.80 0.53 0.57 1972-2004 IFS
Colombia 2.30 2.78 (1.21) 7.34 (3.19) 0.81 0.32 0.14 1972-2004 WDI
Costa Rica 3.69 5.17 (1.40) 3.71 (1.01) 0.84 0.83 0.68 1972-2004 WDI
Dominican Republic 3.48 5.25 (1.51) 25.91 (7.46) 0.74 0.19 -0.07 1972-2004 IFS
Ecuador 3.77 3.32 (0.88) 13.55 (3.59) 0.57 0.44 0.27 1972-2004 IFS
El Salvador 5.85 5.08 (0.87) 6.46 (1.10) 0.86 0.44 0.31 1972-2004 IFS
Guatemala 3.27 3.06 (0.94) 8.97 (2.74) 0.88 0.36 0.26 1972-2004 IFS
Guyana 9.33 12.99 (1.39) 18.84 (2.02) 0.59 0.30 -0.10 1972-1993 IFS
Haiti 3.02 3.97 (1.31) 13.81 (4.57) 0.71 0.27 -0.07 1972-1990 WDI
Honduras 3.21 2.37 (0.74) 7.47 (2.33) 0.25 0.07 0.35 1972-2004 IFS
Jamaica 2.89 3.83 (1.33) 9.97 (3.46) 0.62 0.02 0.08 1972-2003 IFS
Mexico 3.53 4.38 (1.24) 8.42 (2.39) 0.80 0.70 0.71 1972-2004 IFS
Nicaragua 7.13 10.65 (1.49) 18.11 (2.54) 0.29 0.24 -0.67 1972-2004 WDI
Panama 5.69 7.37 (1.29) 6.45 (1.13) 0.43 0.45 0.31 1972-2004 IFS
Paraguay 4.14 5.67 (1.37) 13.32 (3.21) 0.64 0.58 0.21 1972-2004 WDI
Peru 5.92 6.83 (1.15) 12.41 (2.10) 0.69 0.69 0.67 1972-2004 IFS
St. Lucia 4.40 11.69 (2.66) 7.14 (1.63) 0.78 -0.02 -0.13 1977-2003 IFS
Suriname 2.88 4.13 (1.43) 13.67 (4.74) 0.70 0.43 -0.07 1990-2003 WDI
Trinidad and Tobago 5.47 10.50 (1.92) 13.23 (2.42) 0.64 0.43 0.66 1972-2004 IFS
Uruguay 5.45 6.64 (1.22) 7.50 (1.38) 0.97 0.51 0.45 1972-2004 IFS
Venezuela, RB 5.05 7.58 (1.50) 17.94 (3.55) 0.57 0.49 0.17 1972-2004 IFS
Latin America & Caribbean Average 4.63 6.40 (1.38) 11.12 (2.66) 0.67 0.39 0.22
Standard Deviation(%)
PC (relative to Y) GC (relative to Y)




Country/Region (number of country) Contemporaneous Correlations Sample Period Source
Y Y, PC Y, GC PC, GC
Sub-Saharan Africa (40)
Angola 3.68 12.23 (3.33) 5.85 (1.59) 0.50 -0.28 -0.71 1980-1990 WDI
Benin 3.50 4.70 (1.34) 15.78 (4.51) 0.51 0.40 0.19 1972-2004 IFS
Botswana 4.10 18.10 (4.41) 18.19 (4.43) 0.38 0.26 0.89 1974-2004 IFS
Burkina Faso 2.22 4.28 (1.93) 9.22 (4.15) 0.48 0.38 -0.20 1972-2003 WDI
Burundi 4.61 6.45 (1.40) 15.60 (3.38) 0.80 0.47 0.13 1972-2004 IFS
Cameroon 6.04 7.97 (1.32) 9.57 (1.59) 0.77 0.51 0.40 1972-2004 WDI
Cape Verde 2.68 3.48 (1.30) 10.48 (3.90) 0.49 0.27 -0.19 1980-2002 IFS
Central African Republic 3.69 5.91 (1.60) 7.89 (2.14) 0.85 -0.11 -0.06 1972-1991 WDI
Chad 7.24 10.59 (1.46) 19.25 (2.66) 0.88 0.28 0.16 1983-2004 WDI
Comoros 2.41 4.82 (2.00) 7.76 (3.22) 0.45 0.16 -0.18 1980-2003 WDI
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2.53 5.44 (2.15) 27.71 (10.97) 0.63 0.21 0.08 1993-2002 WDI
Congo, Rep. 7.56 13.33 (1.76) 15.62 (2.07) 0.53 0.49 0.02 1972-2004 WDI
Cote d'Ivoire 5.31 7.08 (1.34) 8.56 (1.61) 0.90 0.73 0.65 1972-2004 WDI
Ethiopia 12.01 12.64 (1.05) 21.23 (1.77) 0.93 0.70 0.49 1972-2001 IFS
Gabon 11.65 8.94 (0.77) 14.35 (1.23) -0.27 0.56 -0.25 1972-2004 WDI
Gambia, The 2.78 12.97 (4.67) 13.46 (4.84) 0.04 -0.21 -0.36 1972-2004 WDI
Ghana 3.83 11.74 (3.06) 11.58 (3.02) 0.51 0.15 -0.39 1972-2004 WDI
Guinea-Bissau 6.18 13.48 (2.18) 11.76 (1.90) 0.42 0.39 -0.05 1972-2004 WDI
Kenya 7.53 7.58 (1.01) 9.07 (1.20) 0.70 0.79 0.77 1972-2004 IFS
Lesotho 5.83 7.33 (1.26) 7.22 (1.24) 0.24 -0.01 0.18 1972-2004 WDI
Madagascar 3.58 3.40 (0.95) 13.89 (3.88) 0.67 0.42 0.06 1972-2004 IFS
Malawi 4.02 7.37 (1.83) 9.87 (2.46) 0.68 -0.29 -0.63 1972-2004 WDI
Mali 4.78 4.60 (0.96) 15.48 (3.24) 0.76 0.10 -0.11 1972-2004 WDI
Mauritania 2.49 11.84 (4.75) 18.15 (7.28) 0.21 0.23 -0.13 1972-2000 WDI
Mauritius 4.27 5.79 (1.35) 7.98 (1.87) 0.38 0.55 0.66 1972-2004 IFS
Mozambique 6.72 7.07 (1.05) 15.81 (2.35) 0.84 0.23 0.42 1980-2004 WDI
Namibia 2.13 8.30 (3.90) 3.84 (1.80) 0.07 0.18 0.33 1980-2004 WDI
Niger 6.64 12.11 (1.82) 13.17 (1.98) 0.51 0.33 -0.39 1972-1999 WDI
Nigeria 11.53 16.37 (1.42) 22.51 (1.95) 0.72 0.35 0.48 1972-2003 IFS
Rwanda 12.76 8.39 (0.66) 20.90 (1.64) 0.78 0.67 0.35 1972-2004 WDI
Senegal 3.39 2.69 (0.79) 5.44 (1.60) 0.66 0.34 0.58 1972-2004 WDI
Sierra Leone 8.79 7.87 (0.89) 16.82 (1.91) 0.82 0.79 0.70 1972-2003 IFS
South Africa 2.08 2.57 (1.24) 4.21 (2.03) 0.52 0.05 0.37 1972-2004 IFS
Sudan 7.26 8.99 (1.24) 11.44 (1.58) 0.69 -0.08 -0.49 1972-1990 WDI
Swaziland 4.39 8.93 (2.04) 10.34 (2.36) 0.09 -0.06 0.22 1977-2001 IFS
Tanzania 2.18 2.91 (1.33) 15.77 (7.22) -0.08 0.59 -0.41 1990-2004 WDI
Togo 5.81 9.65 (1.66) 10.89 (1.87) 0.53 0.19 -0.14 1972-2004 WDI
Uganda 3.20 3.73 (1.17) 4.36 (1.36) 0.94 0.31 0.25 1982-2004 WDI
Zambia 3.06 9.60 (3.14) 16.89 (5.53) 0.44 0.11 -0.20 1972-2004 WDI
Zimbabwe 5.84 10.78 (1.85) 15.02 (2.57) 0.17 0.07 -0.23 1972-2002 WDI
Sub-Saharan Africa Average 5.26 8.30 (1.83) 12.82 (2.95) 0.53 0.28 0.08
Average all countries (148) 5.07 6.69 (1.48) 10.00 (2.43) 0.60 0.32 0.22
Average OECD countries (23) 2.18 2.32 (1.07) 2.74 (1.28) 0.76 0.16 0.26
  of which G7 countries (7) 1.87 1.91 (1.03) 2.55 (1.33) 0.83 -0.06 0.00
  of which Other OECD countries (16) 2.32 2.50 (1.09) 2.82 (1.26) 0.73 0.26 0.38
Average Developing Countries (125) 5.60 7.49 (1.55) 11.34 (2.64) 0.58 0.35 0.21
    (relative to G7 countries) (2.99) (3.91) (4.45)
  of which Emerging Market Countries (33) 4.63 5.49 (1.30) 9.60 (2.43) 0.64 0.43 0.33
    (relative to G7 countries) (2.47) (2.87) (3.76)
  of which Other Developing Countries (92) 5.95 8.21 (1.64) 11.96 (2.72) 0.55 0.31 0.16
    (relative to G7 countries) (3.18) (4.29) (4.69)
2/ Variables are: Y, real GDP; PC, real private consumption; GC, real government consumption.
3/ Some OECD member countries, which joined OECD after 1990s and/or are typically classified as emerging market countries (i.e. Turkey, Mexico, Czech, Hungary, Poland, Korea and
Slovakia), are included in the developing countries.
4/ We include Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Cote D'Ivore, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico,
Morocco, Nigeria, Panama, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Korea, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Urugay, Venezuela, Vietnam, which are all included in
the JP Morgan's EMBI global sovereign spread, in the emerging market countries.
Standard Deviation(%)
PC (relative to Y)
Table 2.5: (Appendix) Volatilities and Correlations of GDP, Private Consumption and Government Consumption (continued 3)
1/ Statistics are converted ot real term, taken logarithm, and detrended by Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter of 100.
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Financial Integration and Consumption Risk Sharing 
Abstract 
This paper empirically explores how international financial integration provides risk 
sharing opportunities. In order to answer to this question, a joint test of rational expectation and 
permanent income hypothesis (RE/PIH) is conducted. I pay particular attention to the stochastic 
properties of income process and diverse theoretical predictions for the consumption path 
responding to various types of income shock. Thereby, two unobserved components of income 
(i.e. permanent and transitory components) and three types of income shocks (i.e. level, slope 
and transitory shocks) are considered. The results suggest that there is less than full consumption 
risk sharing overall, while OECD countries are insured better against predictable changes in 
transitory income. I also show that financial integration improves consumption risk sharing on 
the whole. Moreover, OECD and the emerging market countries, albeit to a lesser extent, have 
been sharing risk through cross border holdings of equities and securities besides debts. 
Furthermore, the results support the hypothesis that financial integration leads to an even larger 
adjustment in consumption in response to a permanent shock to income growth, which can 
explain the higher relative volatility of consumption growth in the 1990s and strongly 





Economists typically regard international financial integration as an opportunity to share 
idiosyncratic risks, and thus varieties of theoretical models in international business cycle predict 
that a country should experience a lower relative volatility of consumption vis-à-vis national 
income when it is well-integrated into the international financial market. Nevertheless, Kose, 
Prasad and Terrones (2003) report empirical findings which are incompatible with this prediction 
(Table 3.1). They show that the median ratio of the volatility of total consumption growth rate to 
that of income growth rate for more financially integrated developing countries goes up from the 
1970s and 1980s to the 1990s to reach the level in the 1960s. This is due both to the decrease in 
the volatility of income growth rate as well as to the increase in the volatility of consumption 
growth rate. Moreover, industrial countries virtually experienced no change in their average 
relative volatility over time since the 1970s. Given the developments of financial integration 
during last several decades and particularly the surge in the cross border capital flow among the 
developed countries in the 1990s, those findings are interpreted as puzzling and cast some doubts 
on the functioning of international financial integration in terms of providing better opportunities 
to share idiosyncratic risks. 
On closer inspection, these patterns of relative volatility of consumption growth rate are 
puzzling because they contradict to the usual prediction of rational expectations and the 
permanent income hypothesis (RE/PIH). However, I claim that RE/PIH prediction is indeed 
contingent on the types of income shock and process considered. When income growth is 
positively autocorrelated, consumption volatility can exceed income volatility under risk sharing, 
contrarily to the standard case of mean reverting income process. With this idea in mind, this 
paper empirically explores how international financial integration provides risk sharing 
opportunities. The goals of this analysis are to test whether countries are subject to credit 
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constraint and to investigate how financial integration improves consumption risk sharing, after 
accounting for the stochastic properties of the income process. Specifically, I apply joint test of 
RE/PIH, which is developed by Flavin (1981) and then expanded by Elwood (1998) who argue 
that due consideration for the specification of the income process is crucial. By explicitly 
considering multiple income components which follow different processes respectively, this 
paper tries to disentangle the adjustment patterns of consumption path against the various types 
of income shocks when sample countries are integrated to international financial markets. To be 
specific, the empirical results clarify the presence of full international consumption risk sharing 
for transitory component of income. Furthermore, the results show how financial integration 
helps consumption risk sharing against predictable income changes as well as various types of 
income shocks including level shock (permanent shock to level income), slope shock (shock to 
the income growth) and transitory shock. 
The results suggest that there is less than full consumption risk sharing overall, while 
OECD countries are insured better against predictable changes in transitory income. Moreover, 
while international financial integration is shown to improve consumption risk sharing on the 
whole, some of this effect is attributed to rating effect of country classification group. In addition, 
an even larger increase in consumption responding to permanent shock to income growth with 
more financial integration is supported, which is consistent with the prediction of RE/PIH. 
This paper is related to a vast empirical literature discussing the lack of international 
consumption risk sharing17, particularly through regression approach focusing on consumption 
growth and income growth. Most of them argue that the fruits of better consumption risk sharing 
are, at best, limited to developed countries and little evidences that developing countries benefit 
                                                     
17 Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) point out that consumption correlations are too low to be explained 
by a standard DSGE model with complete markets (the quantity anomaly). 
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from recent financial integration in this sense have been reported. Lewis (1996) shows that 
consumption risk sharing cannot be rejected for unrestricted countries, by allowing for both 
nonseparability between tradables and nontradable leisure or goods and capital market 
restrictions. On the other hand, Sørenson and Yosha (1998), applying risk sharing regression 
developed by Asdrubali, Sørenson and Yosha (1996), show only 40% of shocks to GDP are 
insured in European countries and OECD countries. Among many of the succeeding studies, 
three recent studies are most closely related to this paper. Artis and Hoffmann (2006) show that 
OECD countries have become more insured against permanent shocks. Kose, Prasad and 
Terrones (2007), who explicitly investigate the impact of financial integration on consumption 
smoothness, argue that developed countries have attained better risk sharing outcomes during the 
recent period of globalization, while developing countries have been shut out of this benefit. 
Contrarily, Bai and Zhang (2005) show that there have been no substantial improvement in the 
degree of international risk sharing in the last two decades even in developed countries. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses theoretical predictions 
for consumption path under risk sharing with various income processes. Section 3 reviews ways 
to measure the degree of international financial integration. Section 4 describes the data set used 
in the analysis. Section 5 presents the empirical framework and methodology. Section 6 shows 
regression results. Finally, section 7 draws up the conclusions. 
 
III.2 Theoretical Predictions under Risk Sharing with Various Income Processes 
In this section, I show that prediction of RE/PIH on consumption path hinges on the 
underlying types of income shocks and processes. These predictions are the bases of the null 
hypotheses to be tested in the following sections. Note that discussions are based on the 
assumption of a simple endowment economy under trade in one period bonds where households 
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can not use investment to smooth consumption. 
As is illustrated in Figure 3.1, RE/PIH predicts that consumption growth should be 
smaller than income growth in a small open endowment economy under risk sharing, when the 
income process is mean reverting. This supports the conventional notion that financially 
integrated countries should benefit by consumption smoothness. Since the domestic agents seek 
to adjust consumption level by trading one period bonds when they foresee future income 
changes, already anticipated income changes may not affect consumption at all under full risk 
sharing. Furthermore, if the agents have an opportunity to insure through contingent bonds in 
advance, then even unpredicted income changes may not affect consumption. 
On the other hand, when income follows random walk, RE/PIH predicts that 
consumption growth should correspond to income growth even under risk sharing (Figure 3.2). 
This implies that volatility of consumption is independent of the degree of international financial 
integration. Nevertheless, should the contingent bonds be the available option, financial 
integration would lead to lower consumption volatility. 
Moreover, as Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) recently argue, income process may be 
characterized by permanent shock to income growth rate rather than transitory shock to level 
income, particularly in the emerging market countries. As illustrated by Figure 3.3, RE/PIH 
predicts that instantaneous increase in consumption should be greater than that of income in a 
small open endowment economy, when income changes are positively autocorrelated. Thereby 
higher consumption volatility, as well as strongly countercyclical current account18, is possible 
under risk sharing. 
                                                     
18 Related to this, Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2004) report procyclical capital inflow in most of the 
developed and developing countries. They provide three explanations which are based on (i) dominating 
investment effect in a standard international business cycle model with physical capital stock, (ii) 
intertemporal distortion in consumption imposed by temporary policies, and (iii) varying risk premium 
over the business cycle. 
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These simple exercises show that we need to draw a sharp line between consumption risk 
sharing and consumption smoothness. In fact, consumption risk sharing can reinforce volatility 
of consumption exceeding that of income, when positively autocorrelated permanent income 
shocks dominate transitory shocks. Therefore, I will pay explicit attention to those diverse 
predictions of RE/PIH for the consumption path responding to various types of income shock 
under risk sharing in the empirical analysis. 
 
III.3 Measuring International Financial Integration 
This section is devoted to discuss the ways to measure degree of international financial 
integration, which are indispensable to analyze the impact of integration on consumption risk 
sharing. There is some consensus that international financial integration has dramatically 
advanced in last two decades in the globalization era following the goods and services trade 
integration. Number of emerging market and other developing countries took liberalization 
policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s, after developed countries adopted open capital account 
policy in the 1970s and 1980s. Therefore, international financial integration is true of not only 
developed countries but also of emerging market countries in post 1990 period. Since capital 
account liberalization policy typically precedes spur for the foreign investment, I consider two 
kinds of measure of international financial integration, which are de jure measure based on 
capital account liberalization policy adopted and de facto measure founded on a realized macro 
variable. 
As a de jure measure of international financial integration, I employ official equity 
market liberalization indicator constructed by Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005). They 
specify a date of formal regulatory change after which foreign investors officially have the 
opportunity to invest in domestic equity securities which potentially has far-reaching impact on 
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the consumption risk sharing. This indicator is a binary variable taking a value of one when the 
equity market is officially liberalized and thereafter, and zero otherwise (denoted by BHL 
hereafter). According to BHL, many of the OECD countries were already open by 1980 and most 
of the remaining OECD countries were financially liberalized in the 1980s. On the other hand, 
many of the emerging market countries became liberalized only in the late 1980s or in the early 
1990s, and some other developing countries are to be officially opened up to foreign investors. 
An alternative avenue being explored in the literature is de facto measures based on 
actual capital flows and other realized macroeconomics variables. Those measures include 
saving-investment correlation which probably is the most popular one after Feldstein and 
Horioka puzzle (Feldstein and Horioka, 1980). Nevertheless, alternative explanations for the 
observed high saving-investment correlation are proposed by Tesar (1991). Moreover this 
correlation based measure is hard to apply for the empirical analysis based on annual frequency 
data. In this sense, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) recently proposed a direct measure of de 
facto financial openness by estimating gross stocks of foreign assets and liabilities. The measure 
(denoted by LMF hereafter)19 computes gross assets and liabilities including portfolio equity, 
FDI, debt, financial derivatives and official reserves, via the accumulation of the corresponding 
inflows and outflows as well as relevant adjustments for valuation changes, and is normalized by 







=  (1) 
where FA (FL) denotes the stock of external asset (liabilities) and GDP is denominated in current 
                                                     
19 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) also proposed alternative de facto measure based on only FDI and 
portfolio equity data (GEQ). While LMF and GEQ show similar tendency, the latter shows more rapid and 
wider integration after the 1990s. This difference is considered to be derived from the valuation changes of 
equity assets during the boom in the stock market, which affect the numerator of GEQ more prominently 
and does not directly affect the denominators. This implies that both GEQ and LMF, albeit in lesser extent, 
are subject to over identification when leading stock markets are in the boom. 
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US$20. This stock based measure is less problematic for my analysis than the ones based on 
underlying flow data. Since I explicitly allow multiple income shocks which simultaneously 
have different and potentially offsetting impacts on saving and capital flow paths with various 
adjustment patterns of consumption, year to year flow data may not be an appropriate indicator 
of financial integration for my purpose. For example, simultaneous positive permanent shock to 
the income growth rate and transitory shock may affect national saving oppositely under risk 
sharing, and so result in smaller capital flow even under completely functioning credit market. 
Figure 3.4 plots unweighted mean of the LMF for OECD21 and developing countries 
from 1970 to 2004. While degree of financial integration has increased over time for both 
country groups, surge in the cross border financial asset holdings after the mid-1980s and its 
acceleration in the 1990s in OECD countries are not matched by the developing countries. The 
scale of financial integration for the emerging market countries22, a sub-sample of the developing 
countries, largely follow the trend of whole developing countries, while emerging market 




This paper examines the patterns of consumption risk sharing assuming various types of 
income shocks and investigates how financial integration improves consumption risk sharing. 
For this purpose, I employ annual per capita real GDP and per capita real private consumption 
                                                     
20 All the data used to construct this measure is provided by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). 
21 The OECD countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom (UK), and United State of America (USA). 
22 The emerging market countries cover Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Cote D'Ivore, 
Croatia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Hungary, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Morocco, Panama, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, which are all included in the JP Morgan's EMBI global sovereign spread. 
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(both are in constant US$ in 2000) taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI). In 
order to conduct a panel data analysis, the data set needs to be in real terms and denominated in a 
same unit. Considering the existence of non-traded goods and durable goods, it would have been 
more appropriate to use disaggregated consumption data. However, such data is not available for 
large numbers of countries including developing countries as well as long time series over 30 
years. For the measure of financial integration, as discussed in section 2, I employ LMF based on 
the sum of gross stocks of foreign assets and liabilities divided by GDP, relying on the External 
Wealth of Nations Mark II data provided by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006), as well as BHL 
based on the date of official equity market liberalization following Bekaert, Harvey and 
Lundblad (2005). 
There are 113 countries23 in the sample, which can be divided into sub-samples of OECD 
countries (22), the emerging market countries (30) and other developing countries (61). The 
sample covers from 1970 to 2004, which I consider both whole period as well as globalization 
period after 1990. The sample composition changes overtime, since data are missing for a 
number of countries particularly for developing countries in the earlier years. 
 
III.5 Estimation Model 
The empirical analysis consists of two stages. The first stage decomposes GDP into 
permanent and transitory components and specifies their processes using the 
state-space/unobserved component model. I assume particular income processes for these two 
components respectively and jointly estimate the autoregressive coefficient as well as various 
income shocks which present predictable and unpredictable income changes for these two 
                                                     
23 Luxemburg and Hong Kong are excluded from the sample due to extreme value for LMF as pointed out 
by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). 
62 
 
components respectively. Note that the autoregressive coefficients vary by countries, since I 
consider country specific business cycles. The second stage analyzes excess sensitivity of 
consumption applying the result of the first stage. This inquires whether consumption risk 
sharing holds in the sense that RE/PIH is rejected or not, after accounting for the stochastic 
nature of the income path. Moreover, by including the interaction terms between income changes 
and degree of international financial integration, I can explicitly investigate the impact of 
financial integration on the validity of RE/PIH and successful consumption risk sharing. 
First, I decompose GDP (yi,t) into two components of permanent component (yPi,t) and 
transitory component (yTi,t) as, 
  (2) P Ti,t i,t i,ty y y= +
where subscript i and t denote country and year respectively. I assume that permanent component 
(yPi,t) follows local linear trend model following Harvey (1989), 
 
P P 2
i,t i,t 1 i,t 1 i,t i,t
2
i,t i,t 1 i,t i,t
y y , ~ NID(0, )
, ~ NID
− − η ,
(0, ),− ζ
= + µ + η η σ
µ = µ + ζ ζ σ
 (3) 
where I call µi,t as slope. ηi,t and ζi,t, which are serially independent disturbances from normal 
distributions with zero mean, are the level shock and slope shock respectively. Note that ηi,t and 
ζi,t-1 represent new information at period t, which may affect consumption at that period (ci,t). On 
the other hand, ∆yPi,t-1 - ηi,t-1 represents a change in the component at period t that is fully 
anticipated by a rational agent given this specification. Note that predictable change in 
permanent component of income is governed by slope of the previous period, which is past 
information known to rational agents (that is, ∆yPi,t-1 - ηi,t-1 = µ i,t-2). Then, consumption should 
respond more to unanticipated slope shock (ζi,t-1) than to predictable change in permanent 
component of income (∆yPi,t-1 - ηi,t-1), when forward looking rational agents succeed in 
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consumption risk sharing. 
I also assume that transitory component (yTi,t) follows AR(1) process, 
 T T T 2i,t i i,t 1 i,t i,ty y , ~ NID(0, ),− ε= φ + ε ε σ  (4) 
where φTi is the autoregressive coefficient and εi,t is serially independent disturbance from a 
normal distribution with zero mean. This stochastic disturbance εi,t, which I call transitory shock, 
is the change in transitory component of income (∆yTi,t) which can not be anticipated by a 
rational agent. The remaining elements of ∆yTi,t, calculated as φTi∆yTi,t-1 - εi,t-1, is a function of 
past information and model structure, both of which are predictable by rational agents. Thus, if 
RE/PIH holds, the consumption should respond to εi,t but may not to φTj∆yTi,t-1 - εi,t-1. 
Using the state-space/unobserved component model, permanent component (yPi,t), slope 
(µi,t), transitory component (yTi,t), autoregressive coefficient (φTi), and the error terms (ηi,t, ζi,t and 
εi,t) are jointly estimated and computed. Thereby I identify various unanticipated shocks (ηi,t, ζi,t-1 
and εi,t) and predictable income changes in permanent and transitory components of income 
(∆yPi,t-1 - ηi,t-1 and φTj∆yTi,t-1 - εi,t-1) respectively. 
Second, I check the presence of excess sensitivity in consumption as well as investigate 
the impact of financial integration on the ability to share risks, after accounting for the stochastic 
properties of income path using the information obtained in the first stage. Specifically, I 
consider following estimation 
  (5) 
c LVL LVL
i,t 1 i,t 2 i,t i,t
SLP SLP
1 i,t 2 i,t i,t
P P
1 i,t 2 i,t i,t
T T
1 i,t 2 i,t i,t
T T
1 i,t 2 i,t i,t
c k LVLSHK (LVLSHK * LMF )
SLPSHK (SLPSHK * LMF )
PRDPMNT (PRDPMNT * LMF )
TRSTSHK (TRSTSHK * LMF )
PRDTRST (PRDTRST * LMF )
L
∆ = + β + β
+ β + β
+ γ + γ
+ β + β
+ γ + γ
+ δ i,t i i,tMF v u ,+ +
where kc is a constant term, which helps capture the effects of subsequent generations’ increased 
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consumption due to greater lifetime wealth from increased productivity over time following 
Elwood (1998). The regression is estimated by fixed effects model, and so vi represents the 
unobserved time-invariant country-specific effects. ui,t is an error term including measurement 
error and preference shocks. LVLSHK, SLPSHK, and TRSTSHK are level shock (ηi,t), slope 
shock (ζi,t-1), and transitory shock (εi,t) respectively obtained in the first stage. PRDPMNT and 
PRDTRST are the predictable income changes in permanent component (∆yPi,t-1 - ηi,t-1) and 
transitory component (φTi∆yTi,t-1 - εi,t-1) respectively, which can be computed based on the result 
of first stage regression. LMF is the de facto measure of international financial integration based 
on the estimated gross stocks of foreign assets and liabilities defined in the section 2. 
As a robustness check, I also run the same estimation model with alternative de jure 
measure of BHL as following, 
   (6) 
c LVL LVL
i,t 1 i,t 2 i,t i,t
SLP SLP
1 i,t 2 i,t i,t
P P
1 i,t 2 i,t i,t
T T
1 i,t 2 i,t i,t
T T
1 i,t 2 i,t i,t
c k LVLSHK (LVLSHK * BHL )
SLPSHK (SLPSHK * BHL )
PRDPMNT (PRDPMNT * BHL )
TRSTSHK (TRSTSHK * BHL )
PRDTRST (PRDTRST * BHL )
B
∆ = + β + β
+ β + β
+ γ + γ
+ β + β
+ γ + γ
+ δ i,t i i,tHL v u .+ +
 
III.6 Empirical Results 
Table 3.2.a shows the parameter estimates of the regression with LMF by fixed effects 
model for whole sample period as well as post 1990 globalization period respectively. Moreover, 
marginal propensities of consumption (MPCs) for the unpredictable income changes (that is level, 
slope and transitory shocks) as well as the predictable income changes in permanent and 
transitory components for an average country in terms of degree of international financial 
integration are reported in Table 3.2.b. Those results are also reported for sub-sample regressions 
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within country group (i.e. OECD (Table 3.3.a/b) and the emerging market countries (Table 
3.4.a/b)). 
For permanent component of income, as naturally expected, the results provide 
significantly positive MPCs for the level shock and the slope shock respectively. The coefficients 
indicate that consumption instantaneously grows responding to those shocks for average degree 
of international financial integration and other reasonable levels of LMF. This also holds in most 
of the cases for sub-samples regardless of the country groups (i.e. OECD and the emerging 
market countries) and periods (i.e. full sample period and post 1990 globalization period). I also 
find significantly positive MPC for the predictable change in permanent component of income 
both in full sample countries cases and sub-sample countries cases of OECD and the emerging 
market countries. Moreover, I do not obtain any evidences supporting that MPC for predictable 
change in permanent component is significantly smaller than MPC for slope shock, and indeed 
the former often exceeds the latter. This suggests that countries are hardly successful in insuring 
against the predictable change in permanent component of income. Turning our eyes to the 
implication of financial integration, estimates of the full sample regressions (γ2P) indicate that 
consumption comes to be adjusted less to predictable changes in permanent component of 
income as countries become more involved in cross border holdings of financial assets. This 
implies that financial integration improves consumption risk sharing against permanent income 
changes on the whole. However, such result is less clear and inconsistent sub-sample regressions, 
which imply that financial integration does not necessarily improve consumption risk sharing 
within country groups. The estimates for the impact of financial integration on the response of 
consumption to level shock (β2LVL) are thought-provoking. Since level shock indicates an 
equivalent scale one time change in the permanent income, it should have affected consumption 
permanently regardless of the degree of financial market integration, if primary channel of 
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international consumption risk sharing is through lending and borrowing. However, contrarily to 
this prediction, estimated coefficients for the interaction term between level shock and degree of 
financial integration (β2LVL) are negative and significantly different from zero. This significantly 
negative β2LVL is observed more clearly in the sub-sample regressions among OECD24 and, to 
lesser extent, the emerging market countries. This implies that well-integrated OECD and the 
emerging market countries are insured against idiosyncratic level shocks through prearranged 
contingent bonds such as cross border holding of equities and securities. Furthermore, I observe 
evidences that international financial integration promotes even higher consumption growth 
volatility responding to the permanent shock to the GDP growth. Consistently with the RE/PIH 
prediction, the coefficient for the interaction term between slope shock and degree of financial 
integration (β2SLP) is significantly positive within emerging market countries both in whole 
period and globalization era after 1990. While I also observe positive β2SLP in full sample and 
OECD in globalization era, estimates of β2SLP are much larger for the emerging market countries. 
These results suggest that financial integration leads to an even sharper adjustment of 
consumption responding to permanent shock to the income growth particularly in the emerging 
market countries. 
As for the transitory income, I also observe significantly positive MPCs for transitory 
shock for average degree of international financial integration in full sample regressions. 
However, it is not the case in OECD countries for post 1990 regression. This suggests that the 
average OECD countries have come to be well-insured against transitory income shock through 
prearranged contingent bonds in the globalization period. For predictable income change, 
RE/PIH is rejected for transitory component on the whole25, as shown by significantly positive 
                                                     
24 This result is consistent with the finding by Artis and Hoffmann (2006) which studies consumption risk 
sharing in OECD countries. 
25 One caveat in this interpretation is that the consumption data include non-traded goods which may not 
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MPC for predictable transitory income change in full sample countries case. However, looking at 
the sub-sample countries cases, while significantly positive MPCs for predictable changes in 
transitory income are reported for the emerging market countries, full consumption risk sharing 
is not rejected in average OECD countries. Turning our attention to the implication of financial 
integration, I observe no clear evidences which support that international financial integration 
de-links predictable change in transitory component of income and consumption. The 
coefficients on the interaction term between predictable transitory income change and degree of 
financial integration (γ2T) are not significantly different from zero for full sample countries case 
as well as any sub-sample countries cases. On the other hand, the parameter estimates for the 
interaction term between transitory shock and degree of financial integration (β2T) are 
significantly negative. This implies that consumption comes to instantaneously respond less to 
transitory shock as countries become more involved in the cross border holdings of financial 
assets, suggesting that financial integration improves risk sharing through contingent bonds. 
Looking at the sub-samples, I also observe significantly negative β2T within the emerging market 
countries in the post 1990 period. The emerging market countries, which are subject to credit 
constraint against future predictable change in transitory component of income, benefit from 
financial integration in terms of better opportunities of consumption risk sharing particularly 
during the post 1990 globalization period. On the other hand, such impact is detected less clearly 
within OECD countries. This, together with the insignificant MPC for predictable change in 
transitory component of income, implies that OECD countries are well insured for transitory 
income changes regardless of the degree of international financial market integration. 
The parameter estimates and MPCs from the regression with alternative measure of BHL 
                                                                                                                                                              
be perfectly smoothed out even under perfect insurance (see Lewis, 1996). 
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are reported in Table 3.5.a/b (full sample countries), Table 3.6.a/b (OECD)26 and Table 3.7.a/b 
(the emerging market countries). These results are overall comparable with those from the de 
facto measure of LMF confirming the robustness of the empirical results discussed above. 
However, I occasionally obtain less clear results (e.g. insignificant β2SLP in the emerging market 
countries and full sample countries) which are presumably driven by less variation in the binary 
dummy variable by nature. I also find several discrepancies (e.g. negative γ2P in the emerging 
market countries and significantly positive MPC for predictable change in transitory component 
of income in OECD). They can be attributable to the smaller variation of BHL indicator as well 
as to the disparities between developments of de jure restriction measure and de facto measure. 
As Prasad et al (2003) argue, cross border holdings of assets can increase without capital account 
liberalization policy when capital control is less effective. To illustrate this phenomenon, they 
refer to capital flight from some Latin American countries in the 1970s and 1980s. On the other 
hand, liberalization policy may not be enough to induce foreign investors to actually invest in the 
country, either because of other concerns or because of home bias (Bekaert and Harvey (2000)). 
Then, de facto measure of LMF based on stock data may move slowly with substantially long 
lead years before it goes up after liberalization policy is adopted. 
I here sum up the empirical results. First of all, presence of consumption risk sharing 
varies by country classifications and income components. While less than full consumption risk 
sharing is indicated on the whole, RE/PIH is not rejected for transitory component of income in 
OECD countries implying full consumption risk sharing. Nevertheless, the emerging market 
countries are shown to fail to share risks for predictable change in transitory component of 
income, even in the post 1990 globalization period. On the other hand, no evidences suggest 
                                                     
26 Since most of the OECD countries were already liberalized by 1990, estimates of the regression for 
OECD countries in post 1990 period are not reported. 
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successful risk sharing against the predictable change in permanent component of income in the 
full and sub-sample countries. Second, the evidences suggest that international financial 
integration helps consumption risk sharing on the whole. More financially integrated countries 
are shown to cope with income shocks better in general. However, such effects are sometimes 
less clear and inconsistent within OECD and the emerging market countries. This implies that 
country groups such as OECD and the emerging market countries work themselves as sorts of 
rating categories to support consumption risk sharing somewhat independently from the degree 
of financial integration. Third, international financial integration promotes an even larger 
adjustment of consumption responding to unanticipated shock to the income growth. This effect 
is observed particularly clear in the emerging market countries, and it can reconcile the puzzling 
empirical fact reported by Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003), namely higher relative volatility of 
consumption growth in those countries in the 1990s. Fourth, OECD and the emerging market 
countries, albeit to a lesser extent, are insured against various types of shocks through transacting 
equities and securities besides debts. Both OECD and the emerging market countries come to 
adjust consumption less responding to level shock as they become more integrated to financial 
market. Moreover, consumption is much less responsive to unanticipated transitory income 
shock in the 1990s in OECD countries. Those findings together indicate the validity of a channel 
of consumption risk sharing through contingent bonds. 
 
III.7 Conclusion 
This paper asks whether international financial integration improves consumption risk 
sharing. A formal test of RE/PIH is conducted employing de facto and de jure measures of 
financial integration to answer this question. I particularly argue that we must be attentive to 
stochastic properties of income process, since RE/PIH predicts that consumption should respond 
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differently to various types of income shocks. Therefore, I explicitly consider two unobserved 
components of income (i.e. permanent and transitory components) and three types of income 
shocks (level shock, slope shock and transitory shock), following the recent literature 
emphasizing the importance of shocks to the trend growth in the emerging market countries. The 
state-space/unobserved component model jointly estimates those two components of income and 
three types of shocks to present unanticipated income shocks and predictable income changes. 
Then, I investigate whether countries face credit constraint for consumption risk sharing against 
predictable future income changes and how international financial integration improves 
consumption risk sharing. This paper provides richer and sophisticated implications for the 
validity of RE/PIH and impact of financial integration on consumption risk sharing by 
accounting for the multiple income shocks and income components. 
At the onset, results indicate less than full consumption risk sharing in general, while the 
presence of consumption risk sharing varies by country classifications and income components. 
OECD countries are shown to be insured better for changes in transitory component of income, 
while RE/PIH is rejected for the emerging market countries. Moreover, results show that 
countries are hardly successful in insuring against the predictable change in permanent 
component of income regardless of the country classification groups even during the 
globalization period. 
Second, the regression results point to a fact that more integrated countries can deal with 
various income shocks better on the whole. Cross border financial assets holdings are shown to 
provide more opportunities of consumption risk sharing for both permanent and transitory 
components of income. Nevertheless, such effect is sometimes not detected within OECD and 
the emerging market countries respectively implying that those country classification categories 
themselves behave as sorts of rating categories to help better consumption risk sharing 
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independently from the degree of financial integration. Moreover, evidences that OECD and the 
emerging market countries benefit from international financial integration not only from debts 
but also from equities and securities are provided. The response of consumption to level shock 
tends to be smaller in well-integrated countries, while it should be independent of the degree of 
financial integration when primary channel of international risk sharing is through borrowing and 
lending. Moreover, consumption comes to be less adjusted upon being struck by transitory 
shocks in OECD countries in the post 1990 period, which can also be interpreted as an evidence 
of risk sharing through cross border holdings of contingent bonds. 
Third, the estimates for the impact of financial integration on the response of 
consumption to permanent shock to the income growth are consistent with the RE/PIH prediction. 
This effect is particularly clear for the emerging market countries and it can reconcile the 
observed higher relative volatility of consumption growth in the 1990s in the emerging market 
countries. Furthermore, it supports the alternative explanation for procyclical capital inflow and 
strongly countercyclical current account observed in those countries. 
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Industrial Countries 2.18 1.91 2.46 2.03 1.61
(0.23) (0.26) (0.28) (0.30) (0.14)
MFI economies 3.84 3.31 3.22 4.05 3.59
(0.20) (0.42) (0.37) (0.44) (0.62)
LFI economies 4.67 3.36 4.88 4.53 2.70
(0.35) (0.61) (1.01) (0.69) (0.38)
Industrial Countries 2.37 1.47 2.16 1.98 1.72
(0.31) (0.27) (0.25) (0.28) (0.20)
MFI economies 5.18 4.57 4.52 4.09 4.66
(0.51) (0.49) (1.04) (0.94) (0.46)
LFI economies 6.61 5.36 7.07 7.25 5.72
(0.78) (0.58) (1.07) (0.81) (0.78)
Industrial Countries 2.73 2.18 2.99 2.54 1.91
(0.34) (0.33) (0.40) (0.29) (0.30)
MFI economies 5.44 3.60 5.43 5.45 4.78
(0.50) (0.47) (0.45) (0.65) (0.72)
LFI economies 7.25 4.42 9.64 7.56 4.59
(0.84) (0.53) (1.24) (1.23) (0.54)
Industrial Countries 1.86 1.38 1.84 1.58 1.38
(0.23) (0.28) (0.18) (0.19) (0.20)
MFI economies 4.34 3.95 4.19 3.43 4.10
(0.47) (0.51) (0.54) (0.84) (0.53)
LFI economies 6.40 4.85 6.50 6.34 4.79
(0.56) (0.55) (0.93) (0.91) (0.82)
Industrial Countries 0.67 0.75 0.56 0.61 0.58
(0.02) (0.09) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06)
MFI economies 0.81 0.92 0.74 0.76 0.92
(0.07) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.04)
LFI economies 0.80 0.95 0.68 0.82 0.84
(0.08) (0.06) (0.10) (0.51) (0.14)
Source: Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003)
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 3.1: Volatilities of Growth Rates of Selected Variables
Total Consumption (C+G)
Ratio of Total Consumption













LVL) 0.494 *** 0.496 *** 0.558 *** 0.565 ***
(0.021) (0.022) (0.032) (0.032)
LVLSHK * LMF  (β2
LVL) -0.018 * -0.019 * -0.013 -0.013
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
SLPSHK (β1
SLP) 0.439 *** 0.454 *** 0.295 *** 0.323 ***
(0.054) (0.055) (0.073) (0.074)
SLPSHK * LMF  (β2
SLP) 0.001 -0.001 0.041 ** 0.038 **
(0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019)
PRDPMNT (γ1
P) 0.636 *** 0.630 *** 0.548 *** 0.543 ***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.040) (0.041)
PRDPMNT * LMF (γ2
P) -0.016 *** -0.016 *** 0.005 0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
TRSTSHK (β1
T) 0.651 *** 0.649 *** 1.358 *** 1.377 ***
(0.066) (0.066) (0.127) (0.127)
TRSTSHK * LMF (β2
T) -0.211 *** -0.211 *** -0.544 *** -0.553 ***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.068) (0.068)
PRDTRST (γ1
T) 0.678 *** 0.674 *** 0.182 0.149
(0.226) (0.227) (0.338) (0.338)
PRDTRST * LMF (γ2
T) -0.029 -0.018 0.257 0.280
(0.161) (0.161) (0.194) (0.194)
LMF (δ) 1.221 0.936 -3.931 -8.058
(3.608) (4.170) (6.235) (6.775)
CONSTANT -5.890 -29.390 * 10.030 -8.942
(6.120) (16.747) (11.252) (18.489)
YEAR DUMMY No Yes No Yes
mean LMF 1.291 1.291 1.637 1.637
R-squared 0.526 0.533 0.526 0.530
Number of Observations 2914 2914 1525 1525
Number of Countries 113 113 112 112
Notes: 
Upper rows are coefficients and lower rows in parentheses are standard errors.
*** Estimates significantly different from zero at the 1% level
** Estimates significantly different from zero at the 5% level
* Estimates significantly different from zero at the 10% level
whole period after 1990






LVL*average[LMF] 0.470 0.472 0.538 0.543
(MPC for level shock) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
β1
SLP+β2
SLP*average[LMF] 0.441 0.453 0.363 0.385
(MPC for slope shock) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
β1
T+β2
T*average[LMF] 0.379 0.377 0.467 0.472
(MPC for transitory shock) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
γ1
P+γ2
P*average[LMF] 0.616 0.610 0.556 0.555
(MPC for predictable permanent income change) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
γ1
T+γ2
T*average[LMF] 0.641 0.651 0.602 0.607
(MPC for predictable transitory income change) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Notes: 
Upper rows are point estimates and lower rows in parentheses are p-values of the F-test for the hypotheses being equal to zero.
whole period after 1990





LVL) 0.625 *** 0.626 *** 0.592 *** 0.592 ***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.040) (0.040)
LVLSHK * LMF  (β2
LVL) -0.052 *** -0.049 *** -0.023 -0.020
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016)
SLPSHK (β1
SLP) 0.164 ** 0.189 ** -0.054 -0.024
(0.083) (0.085) (0.109) (0.115)
SLPSHK * LMF  (β2
SLP) 0.019 0.009 0.069 *** 0.052 **
(0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025)
PRDPMNT (γ1
P) 0.501 *** 0.483 *** 0.400 *** 0.389 ***
(0.047) (0.048) (0.057) (0.060)
PRDPMNT * LMF (γ2
P) -0.009 -0.001 0.008 0.015
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
TRSTSHK (β1
T) 0.380 *** 0.385 *** 1.225 *** 1.108 ***
(0.111) (0.113) (0.291) (0.297)
TRSTSHK * LMF (β2
T) 0.097 0.108 -0.414 ** -0.317
(0.125) (0.127) (0.203) (0.209)
PRDTRST (γ1
T) 0.950 ** 0.998 ** -0.164 0.090
(0.483) (0.490) (1.002) (1.018)
PRDTRST * LMF (γ2
T) -0.457 -0.526 0.204 -0.058
(0.518) (0.529) (0.804) (0.822)
LMF (δ) 1.245 -16.490 0.710 -20.385
(6.983) (10.552) (9.270) (13.189)
CONSTANT 21.956 -3.701 45.231 20.577
(20.636) (44.854) (31.780) (48.192)
YEAR DUMMY No Yes No Yes
mean LMF 1.838 1.838 2.829 2.829
R-squared 0.634 0.664 0.689 0.715
Number of Observations 722 722 323 323
Number of Countries 22 22 22 22
Notes: 
Upper rows are coefficients and lower rows in parentheses are standard errors.
*** Estimates significantly different from zero at the 1% level
** Estimates significantly different from zero at the 5% level
* Estimates significantly different from zero at the 10% level
whole period after 1990






LVL*average[LMF] 0.529 0.536 0.527 0.536
(MPC for level shock) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
β1
SLP+β2
SLP*average[LMF] 0.199 0.206 0.142 0.123
(MPC for slope shock) (0.003) (0.003) (0.088) (0.172)
β1
T+β2
T*average[LMF] 0.558 0.583 0.053 0.212
(MPC for transitory shock) (0.000) (0.000) (0.871) (0.527)
γ1
P+γ2
P*average[LMF] 0.484 0.481 0.421 0.432
(MPC for predictable permanent income change) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
γ1
T+γ2
T*average[LMF] 0.111 0.031 0.412 -0.075
(MPC for predictable transitory income change) (0.847) (0.958) (0.763) (0.958)
Notes: 
Upper rows are point estimates and lower rows in parentheses are p-values of the F-test for the hypotheses being equal to zero.
whole period after 1990





LVL) 0.765 *** 0.768 *** 0.692 *** 0.732 ***
(0.044) (0.045) (0.092) (0.094)
LVLSHK * LMF  (β2
LVL) -0.050 *** -0.052 *** -0.022 -0.030
(0.015) (0.016) (0.059) (0.059)
SLPSHK (β1
SLP) 0.585 *** 0.559 *** 0.629 *** 0.589 ***
(0.114) (0.116) (0.146) (0.146)
SLPSHK * LMF  (β2
SLP) 0.128 ** 0.171 *** 0.169 ** 0.207 ***
(0.064) (0.065) (0.078) (0.078)
PRDPMNT (γ1
P) 0.372 *** 0.366 *** 0.494 *** 0.483 ***
(0.077) (0.077) (0.109) (0.108)
PRDPMNT * LMF (γ2
P) 0.256 *** 0.284 *** 0.223 *** 0.247 ***
(0.051) (0.052) (0.063) (0.063)
TRSTSHK (β1
T) 0.597 *** 0.644 *** 1.085 *** 1.128 ***
(0.116) (0.116) (0.140) (0.139)
TRSTSHK * LMF (β2
T) -0.028 -0.063 -0.362 *** -0.388 ***
(0.086) (0.087) (0.100) (0.099)
PRDTRST (γ1
T) 0.279 0.140 0.491 0.260
(0.392) (0.394) (0.459) (0.459)
PRDTRST * LMF (γ2
T) 0.496 0.681 0.441 0.668
(0.421) (0.424) (0.479) (0.478)
LMF (δ) -13.479 *** -12.707 *** -60.516 *** -59.374 ***
(3.962) (4.152) (10.789) (11.735)
CONSTANT 12.271 ** 11.737 64.283 *** 58.046 ***
(5.464) (14.356) (14.394) (18.725)
YEAR DUMMY No Yes No Yes
mean LMF 1.087 1.087 1.252 1.252
R-squared 0.690 0.707 0.725 0.740
Number of Observations 833 833 426 426
Number of Countries 30 30 30 30
Notes: 
Upper rows are coefficients and lower rows in parentheses are standard errors.
*** Estimates significantly different from zero at the 1% level
** Estimates significantly different from zero at the 5% level
* Estimates significantly different from zero at the 10% level
whole period after 1990






LVL*average[LMF] 0.710 0.711 0.665 0.694
(MPC for level shock) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
β1
SLP+β2
SLP*average[LMF] 0.725 0.745 0.842 0.848
(MPC for slope shock) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
β1
T+β2
T*average[LMF] 0.567 0.576 0.632 0.643
(MPC for transitory shock) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
γ1
P+γ2
P*average[LMF] 0.650 0.675 0.774 0.792
(MPC for predictable permanent income change) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
γ1
T+γ2
T*average[LMF] 0.818 0.880 1.044 1.096
(MPC for predictable transitory income change) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Notes: 
Upper rows are point estimates and lower rows in parentheses are p-values of the F-test for the hypotheses being equal to zero.
whole period after 1990





LVL) 0.846 *** 0.856 *** 0.217 * 0.226 *
(0.037) (0.038) (0.117) (0.117)
LVLSHK * BHL  (β2
LVL) -0.359 *** -0.362 *** 0.297 ** 0.294 **
(0.040) (0.041) (0.118) (0.118)
SLPSHK (β1
SLP) 0.393 *** 0.420 *** 0.188 0.203
(0.076) (0.076) (0.135) (0.136)
SLPSHK * BHL  (β2
SLP) -0.103 -0.106 0.055 0.059
(0.092) (0.092) (0.145) (0.146)
PRDPMNT (γ1
P) 0.612 *** 0.618 *** 0.497 *** 0.506 ***
(0.043) (0.044) (0.078) (0.078)
PRDPMNT * BHL (γ2
P) -0.105 ** -0.110 ** 0.001 -0.006
(0.045) (0.045) (0.081) (0.081)
TRSTSHK (β1
T) 0.361 *** 0.350 *** 2.371 *** 2.297 ***
(0.136) (0.136) (0.467) (0.468)
TRSTSHK * BHL (β2
T) 0.219 0.243 * -1.671 *** -1.585 ***
(0.143) (0.142) (0.469) (0.471)
PRDTRST (γ1
T) 0.064 -0.094 0.037 0.195
(0.488) (0.488) (1.451) (1.457)
PRDTRST * BHL (γ2
T) 0.564 0.714 0.423 0.245
(0.509) (0.508) (1.460) (1.466)
BHL (δ) 19.552 ** 25.764 ** 25.185 27.699
(9.535) (11.161) (17.101) (18.434)
CONSTANT -9.505 * -24.302 * -11.674 -29.160 *
(5.650) (14.085) (11.017) (14.899)
YEAR DUMMY No Yes No Yes
R-squared 0.675 0.683 0.717 0.722
Number of Observations 1752 1752 1029 1029
Number of Countries 82 82 81 81
Notes: 
Upper rows are coefficients and lower rows in parentheses are standard errors.
*** Estimates significantly different from zero at the 1% level
** Estimates significantly different from zero at the 5% level
* Estimates significantly different from zero at the 10% level
whole period after 1990






LVL 0.487 0.495 0.514 0.521
(MPC for level shock) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
β1
SLP+β2
SLP 0.289 0.314 0.243 0.262
(MPC for slope shock) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
β1
T+β2
T 0.580 0.593 0.700 0.712
(MPC for transitory shock) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
γ1
P+γ2
P 0.508 0.509 0.497 0.500
(MPC for predictable permanent income change) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
γ1
T+γ2
T 0.628 0.620 0.460 0.441
(MPC for predictable transitory income change) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.006)
Notes: 
Upper rows are point estimates and lower rows in parentheses are p-values of the F-test for the hypotheses being equal to zero.
whole period after 1990





LVL) 1.028 *** 1.015 ***
(0.070) (0.069)
LVLSHK * BHL  (β2
LVL) -0.530 *** -0.507 ***
(0.073) (0.073)
SLPSHK (β1
SLP) 0.254 0.384 *
(0.201) (0.199)




P) 0.553 *** 0.548 ***
(0.098) (0.096)




T) -4.066 ** -3.981 **
(2.049) (2.024)
TRSTSHK * BHL (β2





PRDTRST * BHL (γ2
T) -45.579 1.937
(76.109) (75.509)




YEAR DUMMY No Yes
R-squared 0.682 0.711
Number of Observations 493 493
Number of Countries 22 22
Notes: 
Upper rows are coefficients and lower rows in parentheses are standard errors.
*** Estimates significantly different from zero at the 1% level
** Estimates significantly different from zero at the 5% level
* Estimates significantly different from zero at the 10% level
whole period























(MPC for predictable transitory income change) (0.043) (0.056)
Notes: 
Upper rows are point estimates and lower rows in parentheses are p-values of the F-test for the hypotheses being equal to zero.
whole period





LVL) 0.643 *** 0.639 *** 0.674 *** 0.709 ***
(0.050) (0.053) (0.164) (0.170)
LVLSHK * BHL  (β2
LVL) 0.090 0.116 0.051 0.042
(0.075) (0.078) (0.173) (0.180)
SLPSHK (β1
SLP) 1.028 *** 1.057 *** 0.701 *** 0.757 ***
(0.074) (0.076) (0.165) (0.169)
SLPSHK * BHL  (β2
SLP) -0.124 -0.137 0.231 0.186
(0.119) (0.120) (0.192) (0.194)
PRDPMNT (γ1
P) 0.958 *** 0.985 *** 0.826 *** 0.860 ***
(0.051) (0.053) (0.084) (0.087)
PRDPMNT * BHL (γ2
P) -0.097 * -0.104 ** 0.085 0.063
(0.052) (0.053) (0.093) (0.094)
TRSTSHK (β1
T) 0.254 *** 0.242 *** 1.928 *** 1.797 ***
(0.072) (0.074) (0.367) (0.374)
TRSTSHK * BHL (β2
T) 0.389 *** 0.413 *** -1.281 *** -1.134 ***
(0.083) (0.085) (0.370) (0.377)
PRDTRST (γ1
T) -0.117 -0.033 3.147 2.306
(0.272) (0.281) (3.780) (3.874)
PRDTRST * BHL (γ2
T) 1.000 *** 0.857 *** -2.305 -1.533
(0.303) (0.314) (3.781) (3.875)
BHL (δ) -2.279 7.756 -10.214 -3.936
(6.419) (10.913) (12.669) (14.872)
CONSTANT -11.905 *** -8.863 -6.967 -1.576
(4.383) (13.003) (10.351) (14.224)
YEAR DUMMY No Yes No Yes
R-squared 0.764 0.766 0.816 0.818
Number of Observations 499 499 295 295
Number of Countries 23 23 23 23
Notes: 
Upper rows are coefficients and lower rows in parentheses are standard errors.
*** Estimates significantly different from zero at the 1% level
** Estimates significantly different from zero at the 5% level
* Estimates significantly different from zero at the 10% level
whole period after 1990






LVL 0.733 0.755 0.725 0.751
(MPC for level shock) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
β1
SLP+β2
SLP 0.904 0.920 0.932 0.943
(MPC for slope shock) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
β1
T+β2
T 0.643 0.656 0.647 0.663
(MPC for transitory shock) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
γ1
P+γ2
P 0.861 0.881 0.911 0.923
(MPC for predictable permanent income change) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
γ1
T+γ2
T 0.882 0.824 0.842 0.773
(MPC for predictable transitory income change) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Notes: 
Upper rows are point estimates and lower rows in parentheses are p-values of the F-test for the hypotheses being equal to zero.
whole period after 1990









t = 0 t
Figure 3.2: Consumption Path upon Being Struck by Permanent Shock under RE/PIH
y,c
t = 0 t
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The Effects of Interprovincial Migration 
on Human Capital Formation in China†
Abstract 
This paper examines the impacts of interprovincial migration on the creation and 
distribution of human capital in China. First, direct brain drain depends on the existing human 
capital stock in the source provinces. Second, the observed external economies and diseconomies 
of gross outflow migration on new human capital investment are generally consistent with the 
mechanism of migration-oriented investment/disinvestment in higher education at source 
provinces. This positive externality eclipses the negative one at the national level. Third, the 
effects of net outflow migration on new human capital investment based on the changes in 
relative labor supply mitigate direct brain drain by both encouraging and discouraging school 
enrollments at various levels. 
                                               
IV.1 Introduction 
Does migration impact human capital formation in the source (sending) economies in 
addition to affecting the existing human capital stock through direct brain drain? We argue that 
human capital mobility may also affect new human capital investment in the source economies 
both positively and negatively through various mechanisms, which signifies that internal 
                                                     
† This chapter is based on a joint work with Yukari Suzuki. 
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migration may accordingly alter the provincial distribution of human capital as well as the 
overall national level of new human capital formation. It is crucial to appraise these effects in the 
context of often less developed source economies in order to understand the impact of migration 
on regional economic inequality vis-à-vis the human capital theory. 
Various studies have been conducted on the effects of international migration on human 
capital formation in the source economies. Theoretical analyses of brain drain date back to 
Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) who found a negative impact of international migration on human 
capital accumulation at source countries. Most endogenous growth theories stress that education 
is one of the major determinants of economic growth and thus the migration of residents with 
high educational qualifications is expected to have a negative impact on the source economy 
(Lucas, 1988; Stokey, 1991; Barro and Lee, 1993). Contrarily, as Docquier and Rapport (2004) 
survey, recent studies challenge these past studies and suggest that there could be a beneficial 
impact of international migration by taking into account the possibility of failure in migration 
(Mountford, 1997; Stark et al., 1998; Beine et al., 2001 and 2003), migrants’ remittances 
(Edwards and Ureta, 2003; Hanson and Woodruff, 2003; Borraz, 2005; D. Yang, 2005), return 
migration (Borjas and Bratsberg, 1996; Stark et al., 1997), and migrants’ networks (Kanbur and 
Rapoport, 2005). 
However, research on the relationship between internal migration and human capital 
formation in the source economies is still thin. Unlike international migration, direct brain drain 
in internal migration does not affect the overall national level of existing human capital. 
However, as we will point out in section 4, internal migration can potentially influence new 
human capital formation at the national level as well as the regional distribution of human capital, 
given that internal migration flow affects the incentive for residents to invest in education. 
This paper empirically examines the impacts of internal migration on the creation and 
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distribution of human capital, using provincial level datasets from the 1990 and 2000 population 
censuses in China. Most previous works on internal migration in China have mainly investigated 
rural-urban migration. With respect to the effect of rural-urban migration on human capital 
formation, de Brauw and Giles (2005) suggest a negative relationship between migrant’s 
opportunity and high school enrollment in rural China. Our main purpose is to clarify the 
creation and distribution of human capital at various levels of education at the national level by 
measuring the impacts of interprovincial migration on the existing human capital stock as well as 
new human capital investment at the provincial level, and to compare the trends noted in 1990 
and 2000. We first seek to identify the provinces most affected by the direct brain drain through 
internal migration by focusing on the determinants of migration. Thereafter, we check for 
positive and/or negative effects of migration on new human capital investment in the source 
provinces based on two mechanisms: investment/disinvestment in higher education aimed at 
migration opportunities and changes in relative labor supply caused by migration with different 
levels of education. 
In addition, there are several specific factors that make the Chinese case more relevant 
and interesting. First, China has strictly controlled internal migration, particularly migration to 
large cities, through a unique household/residential registration system “hukou.” However, in the 
late 1980s, urban reforms weakened this system and facilitated rural-urban 
migration—especially of the temporary kind—which substantially increased population mobility. 
The number of migrants, including both intraprovincial and interprovincial migrants whose 
current residence is different from their location five years ago rapidly increased from 34 million 
in 1990 to 128 million in 2000. Our dataset shows that migration rates were much higher in 2000 
than in 1990 in most provinces, and these increases can be mainly attributed to migrants with 
high school and junior high school degrees. The probability of migration was distinguishably 
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high for those with college degrees in 1990 but this trend was apparently mitigated in 2000. Such 
unique policies to restrict migration and their subsequent relaxation are naturally expected to 
govern the impact of internal migration on the creation and distribution of human capital in the 
transition process in China. 
Secondly, economic reforms such as the implementation of development strategies 
directed at coastal provinces and urban-oriented fiscal measures and subsidized credit 
dramatically widened regional inequality in the 1990s owing to rural-urban as well as 
inland-coastal disparities. The ratio of the average GDP per capita (at 1990 constant prices) in the 
coastal regions to that in the inland regions increased from 1.67 in 1990 to 2.08 in 1999 (Fu, 
2004). This widening inequality operates as a strong economic incentive for migration from 
poorer provinces to richer provinces, which is in turn expected to strongly impact the trends of 
regional disparity of human capital. 
Furthermore, labor market reforms enabled firms to hire workers less inhibited by the 
registration status and to move from the wage setting under wage grids to a market based setting; 
hence, the returns to skills and schoolings are expected to increase in the transition process. 
Previous literature points out that the return to schoolings in China remained remarkably low 
through the mid-1990s as compared with other transition countries, while it increased gradually 
as the transition process progressed further (Li, 2003; Fleisher et al., 2005). In addition, the 
dispersion of schooling returns across cities is estimated to grow substantially by the mid-1990s, 
which points at the segmentation of regional labor markets (D. T. Yang, 2005). Consequently, 
while the regional dispersion of schooling returns might also influence the incentives of internal 
migration and new human capital investment, the relative labor mechanism categorized by the 
schooling level of the workers was likely to be more impacting in 2000 than in 1990. It is also 
interesting to clarify the impacts of pervasive interregional migration on human capital formation 
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in 1990 as well as 2000 since it can suggest whether a market mechanism such as relative labor 
market functions more effectively as the transition reforms take deeper roots. 
Our main findings are as follows. First, the impact of internal migration through direct 
brain drain at three different educational levels hinges on the composition of the human capital in 
the source provinces. Our results indicate the incidence of more net outflow migration at any 
educational level from provinces with relatively larger populations of junior high school 
graduates. This relationship between migration and existing human capital stock can not be 
completely explained by the labor supply push effects. It is rather presumed to be due to rapid 
and unbalanced economic growth and the unfinished nature of the labor market during the 
transition process. Second, internal migration at different educational levels has both positive and 
negative effects on new human capital investment. The results support the presence of the 
mechanisms of (i) investment/disinvestment in higher education to secure better prospects 
vis-à-vis migration opportunity and (ii) changes in relative wages caused by migration associated 
with the fluctuations in relative labor supply at different educational levels. The analysis of the 
first mechanism indicates both external economies and diseconomies of gross outflow migration 
on new human capital investment at source provinces, while the positive externality eclipses the 
negative one at the national level. The assessment of the second mechanism suggests that the 
effects of interprovincial migration mitigate the direct brain drain by both encouraging and 
discouraging school enrollments at various levels. Our estimates also demonstrate more positive 
and less negative impacts in 2000 as compared with 1990. 
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the datasets 
used for our empirical study and Section 3 shows the characteristics of interprovincial migration 
in 1990 and 2000; Section 4 presents an empirical framework and Sections 5 and 6 show our 





In this analysis, we focus on interprovincial migration, although we recognize that 
intraprovincial migration—especially rural-urban migration within the same province—is also an 
important component of internal migration in China. The dataset for provincial migration in 
China comes from the 1990 and 2000 population censuses28. Migration is defined as the 
relocation of residence within the previous five years in both censuses29. We note a slight 
difference in the definition of migrants between 1990 and 2000 and thus the number of migrants 
in 1990 appears to be understated if we employ the definition of migrants in 2000 as the 
standard30. The number of interprovincial migrants accounts for around 30% of the number of all 
migrants including intraprovincial migrants in 1990 and 2000. In our study, we take into account 
the migrants aged 17−60 at the census years categorized by educational levels. To investigate the 
economic incentives of internal migration, we covered neither younger migrants aged under 17 
who did not graduate from primary schools five years ago (1985/1995) nor older migrants aged 
above 60. The number of interprovincial migrants aged 17−60 excluding those who enrolled in 
schools at the census years tripled from 8.8 million in 1990 to 28.5 million in 2000, and they 
comprised 80−85% of the total number of interprovincial migrants without demographic 
restriction. 
Our study mainly focuses on the relationship between internal migration and human 
                                                     
27 We thank Institute of Population and Labor Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, for 
providing us with the aggregated migration flow data tabulated based on the census data. 
28 In the 2000 census, the relevant questions were asked by long forms whose sampling ratio was 9.5%. 
29 Five year periods were chosen between July 1, 1985 to July 1, 1990 and Nov 1, 1995 to Nov 1, 2000 
(dates of the censuses). 
30 When a person changed his/her residence together with his/her registration, he/she was counted as a 
migrant in both the censuses. When a person changed his/her residence without changing his/her 
registration, he/she was counted as a migrant only if he/she left the place of registration for longer than the 
minimum time period. This period was one year in 1990 but it was reduced to six months in 2000. 
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capital formation at the provincial level. Human capital formation is measured by two kinds of 
education indicators. First, to measure the stock of human capital, we calculate human attainment 
ratios at the various schooling levels—such as junior high school, high school, and 
college31—using data from the 1990 and 2000 population censuses. The human attainment rates 
in junior high school, high school, and college for those aged 17−60 changed from 32.7% to 
43.3%, 11.6% to 14.1%, and 1.9% to 4.7%, respectively, between 1990 and 2000. 
The second set of indicators that captures new human capital investment includes the 
percentage of students who join higher education institutes, such as junior high schools, high 
schools, or colleges vis-à-vis graduates from primary schools; this comparison is made based on 
the ratio of the number of new enrollments in a higher ranked institute to the number of 
graduates from a school a level below in the hierarchy. The nationwide percentage of children 
who had reached the age of schooling and who were enrolled in primary schools was 97.8% in 
1990 and 99.1% in 2000. The percentage of primary school graduate who entered junior high 
schools increased from 74.6% in 1990 to 94.9% in 2000. The percentage of junior high school 
graduates going to high schools also increased from 40.6% in 1990 to 51.2% in 2000. A great 
volume of previous literature shows that internal migrants in China tended to possess degrees 
higher than the junior high school degree in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Liang and White, 
1997; Zhao, 1997). The data derived from the population censuses also show that such migrants 
form the majority and their share increased further from 67.2% in 1990 to 76.9% in 2000. Taking 
into account these findings, we mainly focus on human capital formation at levels higher than 
junior high school. The data on the other variables at the provincial level in our study have been 
taken from the China Statistical Year Book, the Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 
                                                     
31 We categorize junior secondary schools under “junior high school,” senior secondary and secondary 




Fifty Years of New China, and the China Population Statistics Yearbook. 
 
IV.3 Characteristics of Interprovincial Migration in 1990 and 2000 
Before moving to our empirical study on the effects of internal migration on human 
capital formation, we will briefly describe the patterns of interprovincial migration in 1990 and 
2000, employing three kinds of migration rates—gross outflow migration rate, gross inflow 
migration rate, and net outflow migration rate32—for migrants with different levels of education 
between the ages of 17−60 in both the census years. We observe the changes in the 
characteristics of interprovincial migration at different educational levels from 1990 to 2000 
which induce different impacts of migration on human capital formation between those years as 
are introduced in following sections. 
First, we focus on the relationship between gross inflow and outflow migration rates at 
the provincial level. Figure 4.1 shows the change in these rates for all migrants from 1990 to 
2000. Remarkably, migration rates were much higher in 2000 than in 1990 in most provinces. 
Another striking change is that the differential between gross inflow and outflow migration rate 
widened in most provinces and thus the classification of the provinces into the two groups 
vis-à-vis net outflow or inflow migrants became distinct in 2000. While the two groups covered 
approximately equal number of provinces in both the years, seven out of 29 provinces changed 
groups between 1990 and 2000, which suggests a change in the interprovincial migration flow 
pattern in these ten years. In addition, net inflow migration became much more distinct in 
Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong in 2000. 
Second, we compare the migration rates in 1990 and 2000 at different educational levels 
                                                     
32 These are defined as (EDUCATION)MIGO, (EDUCATION)MIGI, (EDUCATION)MIGN respectively 
in Table 4.3. 
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for the whole country. The national average migration rate for the residents with high school 
degrees, junior high school degrees, and other degrees lower than the junior high school, 
respectively increased from 1.9% to 3.8%, 1.7% to 5.0%, and 0.8% to 2.3% from 1990 to 2000, 
while the national average migration rate for those with college degrees slightly decreased from 
5.6% to 4.0%. In both the years, the probability of migration was found to be higher for those 
who had attended educational institutes higher than junior high school. It was distinguishably 
high for those with college degrees in 1990, but this trend was apparently mitigated in 2000 as 
the migration rates for residents with junior high school and high school degrees went up. The 
relaxation of migration control measures in the 1990s appears to have had a greater impact on 
migration opportunities for residents at relatively lower schooling levels such as junior high 
school and high school. In addition, the comparative study of the average net outflow migration 
rates in coastal provinces and inland provinces at three educational levels as shown in Table 4.1 
also suggests the increasing probability of migration for residents with junior high school and 
high school degrees between 1990 and 2000. We found contrasting impacts of interprovincial 
migration on the human capital stock in the coastal and inland provinces at levels of education 
higher than junior high school. In particular, the impact of migration on the human capital stock 
with junior high school and high school degrees dramatically intensified in both coastal and 
inland provinces from 1990 to 2000. 
Third, we analyze the composition of educational levels for outflow migrants, inflow 
migrants, and non-migrants at the provincial level. Figure 4.2 compares the differential of human 
attainment ratios at three levels of education between outflow migrants and non-migrants with 
that between inflow migrants and non-migrants. To investigate the effects of direct brain drain 
caused by outflow/inflow migration on human capital attainment rates at the provincial level, we 
focus on the cumulative human capital stock at educational levels higher than junior high school 
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and high school as well as college. In 1990, outflow as well as inflow migrants in the provinces 
tended to have higher human attainment ratios than non-migrants, as is shown by the fact that 
most provinces belong in the first quadrant in Figure 4.2. However, we notice that in 2000 there 
is an increase in the number of provinces where the human attainment ratios of non-migrants 
were higher than those of outflow or inflow migrants. These facts signify that while the outflow 
migrants negatively impacted the human capital attainment rates at the sending province in 1990, 
outflow migrants could have exerted positive as well as negative impacts on the human capital 
attainment rates in 2000 (the case was the reverse with inflow migrants). 
Fourth, in Table 4.2, we examine the direction of migration, focusing on the composition 
of coastal and inland provinces as the destinations and sources of migration. We categorize all 
migrants and migrants at different educational levels into four groups according to the 
destination and source provinces; migrants within different coastal provinces (CC); from coastal 
provinces to inland provinces (CI); from inland provinces to coastal provinces (IC); and within 
different inland provinces (II). While CC, IC, and II accounted uniformly for approximately 
25−30% of all migrants in 1990, the share of IC increased substantially to 63% in 2000, which is 
consistent with the findings of Lin et al. (2004). These features, true for all migrants, were also 
found valid for migrants with junior high school and high school degrees. By contrast, the share 
of IC for migrants with college degree increased only by 10% as compared with the 
approximately 30% increase for migrants at other educational levels. These changes suggest that 
the incentives of migration to coastal provinces with rapid economic growth were intensified for 
residents with junior high school and high school degrees in the 1990s. 
Finally, we mention the peculiar characteristics of migration with college degrees. A 
nonnegligible part of the college students belonged to provinces other than those where the 
colleges were located and these individuals were not necessarily counted as migrants with 
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college degrees. Some college graduates migrating from other provinces just stayed on to secure 
an urban “hukou,” while other graduates returned to the original provinces or migrated again to 
other provinces. Internal migration with college degrees did not include the first type of 
migration but it did include the second type. Thus, the characteristics of this type of migration 
are expected to be different from that at other educational levels. While the ratio of college 
students from other provinces to all students was stable at around 20% between 1990 and 2000, 
there destination has been diversified as data shows that ratio of the migrants for college 
enrolment to large cities of Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai vis-à-vis all the in college migrants 
decreased from 67% in 1990 to 26% in 2000. 
 
IV.4 Empirical Framework 
This paper investigates the impact of interprovincial migration on human capital 
formation measured by existing stock and new investment at the provincial level in China, laying 
particular emphasis on the relationships between migration rate, human attainment rate, and 
school enrollment rate in the source provinces. Unlike international migration, interprovincial 
migration might be a “zero sum game” among provinces, implying that it does not affect the total 
existing human capital stock at the national level. Even if this were the case, large scale 
migration might have nonnegligible effects on the distribution of human capital in the provinces, 
which can potentially improve efficiency of human capital allocation. Moreover, there are high 
chances for the provinces to play a “positive or negative sum game” rather than a “zero sum 
game” by affecting new human capital investment through some mechanisms characterized by 
externality. This being the case, it is important to analyze the relationships between 
interprovincial migration, human capital stock, and new human capital investment; not merely 
the concern of each province but the interest of the central government becomes an important 
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subject of consideration, since new human capital formation at the national level would be 
influenced by internal migration. We consider two kinds of migration, namely gross outflow 
migration and net outflow migration, since we observe more pervasive two-way migration in the 
case of internal migration than in the case of international migration from developing countries 
to developed countries. In addition, we compare the effects of internal migration at different 
educational levels. 
First, we test the relationship between migration rate and existing human capital stock in 
the source economies. The sum of the effects of internal migration on the existing human capital 
stock in the source economies, associated with the actual migration flows of those with higher 
education, is zero for the whole country by construction. However, an analysis of the relationship 
between the migration rate and existing human capital stock in the source provinces is useful in 
identifying the provinces most affected by the direct brain drain through internal migration. As 
we noted in the previous section, the impact of direct brain drain is totally different for coastal 
and inland provinces. For this purpose, we estimate the following equation. 
 0 1 i t-5 2 i t-5i t
3 i t-5 4 i t-5 i t
MIGN  =  + PCGDPDIFF  + UEMPDIFF  






where MIGNi, PCGDPDIFFi, UEMPDIFFi, HUMADIFFi, TEMPDIFFi, and εi, respectively 
represent net outflow migration rate; GDP per capita differential; unemployment rate differential; 
human attainment ratio differential; temperature differential; and an error term for province i. 
The subscripts t, t-5, and t~  refer respectively to the census years (i.e., 1990 and 2000), the 
inaugural years of the five-year periods considered for this study (i.e. 1985 and 1995), and the 
five years between t and t-5 (i.e. 1985−1990 and 1995−2000). Table 4.3 provides the definitions 
of the variables employed in our estimates, and Table 4.6 summarizes the statistics. 
Second, we investigate the effects of two-way migration on new human capital 
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investment based on the understanding that interprovincial migration has recently become more 
pervasive in China. We check if there are positive and/or negative impacts of gross and net 
outflow migration on new human capital formation in the source provinces. In the previous 
section, we observed that the residents with educational levels higher than the junior high school 
degree were more likely to migrate in 1990 as well as in 2000. Previous studies on international 
migration have discerned a positive effect of gross outflow migration on new human capital 
investment in the source provinces from the point of view of investment in higher education to 
secure better migration opportunities. The uncertainty in migration induced by implicit or 
explicit migration restrictions might create a positive effect in new human capital investment in 
the source economies. Assuming that labor force at different educational levels is heterogeneous 
and that residents who are higher educated are also more likely to migrate, the average level of 
education of non-migrants in the source province will increase if a nonnegligible part of the 
population fails to migrate in spite of migration-oriented investments in education. This impact 
of gross outflow migrants with higher degrees on new human capital investment must be a 
positive one, which was proposed in a model of Beine et al. (2001). However, when residents 
with lesser education are also enabled to migrate, those who seek higher incomes through 
migration decide whether they invest more in education after comparing the returns and 
probabilities of migration at different educational levels and the cost of education. In this case, 
the prospects of migration and securing a higher income even for the less educated would be 
directly proportional to the opportunity cost of education. Therefore, gross outflow migration 
with lower education potentially works as a disincentive for new human capital formation in 
higher education. Consequently, gross outflow migration can have both external economies and 
diseconomies on new human capital formation in the source economies, contingent on the 
educational levels of the migrants, and thus it might work for new human capital formation 
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positively and/or negatively at the national level. The effects of migration on new investment in 
some forms of higher education (e.g. college) are naturally considered to be induced more by the 
migrants at the closest level of education (high school, junior high school, and lower junior high 
school, in order). To test these positive and negative externalities of interprovincial migration on 
new educational investments at various education levels, we estimate the following equation. 
  (2a) i t 0 1 2 i ti t
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where EDUAVEi, MIGOi, PCGDPAVEi, UNEMPAVEi, NUMSCHOOLAVEi, and νi respectively 
represent the average percentage of students who attended higher education institutes; gross 
outflow migration rate; average real GDP per capita; average unemployment rate; and average 
number of schools per unit of land area for three years in succession; and an error term for 
province i. The subscripts t, t-5, and t~  refer the same years as in equation (1). 
Next, from the viewpoint of relative labor supply, net outflow migration can also impact 
new human capital investment at the provincial level by affecting the relative wages of workers 
at different educational levels; this is likely to happen when some aspects of migration (e.g. 
monetary cost, psychological cost, and uncertainty of migration) prevent the full and immediate 
arbitration of wages among the provinces. The net outflow migration of workers in a given 
educational category (e.g. high school) from a province causes excess demand of workers from 
that category, and hence the relative wages of the workers in that category register an increase. 
Furthermore, assuming that labor groups at different educational levels are heterogeneous and 
not perfectly substitute each other, the relative wages of workers in other educational categories 
(college, junior high school, and lower) would register a decrease. Relative labor supply 
mechanism can potentially impact school enrollment either positively or negatively; this signifies 
that net outflow migration at a particular educational level (high school) may encourage new 
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human capital investment at the corresponding level of education (high school) and discourage 
enrollment at a higher level (college). Similar to the effects of gross outflow migration, the 
incentive to attend a corresponding educational institution (high school) is naturally considered 
to be stronger for those who were to join an institute one level lower (junior high school) without 
changes in the relative wages than for those who were to finish their education at a much lower 
level (lower than junior high school). In addition, supposing that the workers at closer 
educational levels are more substitutable, the wages for workers at those levels would be less 
depressed (i.e., wages for those with junior high school degree would be less depressed than for 
those with lower degrees) as a result of net outflow migration of workers in a given education 
category (high school), and thus all residents with lesser qualification in that province would 
have a greater incentive to invest in higher education. When there are net inflow migrants, the 
impact on new human capital investment in the source provinces is opposite to that induced by 
net outflow migrants. Therefore, net outflow migration may have a positive as well as negative 
effect on new human capital investment at the provincial level through relative labor supply 
effects. This labor mechanism is consistent with Ramcharan’s (2002) argument that there is a 
positive association between the inflow of unskilled interstate migrants and high school 
attainment in the destination states in the U.S. We observe that this relative labor supply 
mechanism through internal migration does not affect the overall rate of new human capital 
formation at the national level unlike the former mechanism, from the perspective of 
investment/disinvestment in higher education with view to optimizing migration prospects. 
However, it does affect the provincial distribution of human capital by altering the pattern of new 
human capital investment at the provincial level. In order to analyze this mechanism of changes 
in relative labor supply caused by migration with different levels of education, we estimate 
similar model as equation (2a) but with net outflow migration rate (MIGN) instead of gross 
104 
 
outflow migration rate (MIGO). 
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The three equations are estimated by the fixed effects model or the random effects model, 
and are also estimated by OLS. While the fixed effects model treats residuals as province 
specific errors, the random effects model views them as random errors. We use Hausman’s tests 
to check the validity of the estimates of these two models for new human capital investment at 
different educational levels. Our sample comprises 29 provinces in China, excluding Tibet and 
treating Chongqing as a part of Sichuan province33, owing to the lack of consistent data. All 
variables are taken in natural logarithms. Equation (1) examines the relationship between net 
migration rate and existing human capital stock in the source provinces and equation (2a) and 
equation (2b) test the effects of gross/net migration on new education investment. To avoid 
simultaneity bias and clarify the causality between migration rate and human capital formation, 
we employ different education indicators in the two equations. The measure of new human 
capital formation (EDUAVE i t) in equations (2a) and (2b) is a flow base indicator for the 
successive years of migration and is less likely to directly cause migration, while the stock base 
human attainment rates before migration (HUMADIFFi t-5) used in equation (1) may affect 
migration. Furthermore, we investigate the relationship between human capital stock before 
migration (1985/95) and migration probabilities (1985−1990/1995−2000) in equation (1), while 
we assess the impact of migration probabilities (1985−1990/1995−2000) on new human capital 
investment in succeeding years (1990−93/2000−03) in equations (2a) and (2b). Following the 
implications of our hypotheses, we use net migration rates in equation (1) and equation (2b), 
while gross outflow migration rates are employed in equation (2a). Note that we employ the 
33 Chongqing was included in Sichuan province until 1997. 
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numbers of migrants at different educational levels to calculate these migration rates. 
In equation (1), we use independent variables at time t-5 before migration occurs in order 
to avoid reverse causality. We check if interprovincial net migration flows in an equilibrating 
direction in terms of provincial differentials in economic conditions and existing human capital 
stock. To compare the elasticities of the migration rate at a different educational level with 
respect to relative income levels, relative unemployment rate, and relative human capital stocks 
in the source province, we employ these factors that differentiated a source province from other 
provinces five years ago. In accounting for the relative income levels, we employed the variables 
that reflect the relative GDP per capita of the source province compared with the national 
average (PCGDPDIFFi t-5), average GDP per capita of all provinces except for the source 
province weighted by inverse spatial distance from the source province (PCGDPDIFFAi t-5), and 
average GDP per capita of the surrounding provinces weighted by inverse spatial distance from 
the source province (PCGDPDIFFSi t-5)34. Distance, which could reflect transportation costs, 
psychological costs and the availability of information, might have different impacts on 
interprovincial migration decisions and destination choices across the educational levels of the 
migrants, as Schwartz (1973) suggests for US interdivisional migration using the 1963 census. 
We aim to accommodate this distance effect by weighting the differentials of income, 
unemployment rate, and human capital stock by spatial distance. Variables for temperature 
differences (TEMPDIFFi, TEMPDIFFAi, TEMPDIFFSi) are also included as control variables 
following previous literature. 
In equations (2a) and (2b), we use the variables for GDP per capita at 1990 constant 
prices (PCGDPAVEi), unemployment rate (UEMPAVEi), and number of schools per unit of land 
area (NUMSCHOOLAVEi) between 1990−92/2000−02. The GDP per capita and unemployment 
                                                     
34 We excluded Hainan—an island—while applying this third income difference variable. 
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rate control the provincial economic conditions, while the number of schools per unit of land 
area determines the accessibility of schools in the provinces. These are measured in absolute 
terms, differently from the variables used in equation (1), since equations (2a) and (2b) take into 
account the impacts of these variables as well as migration rates on school enrollment at various 
levels in the sample provinces. 
 
IV.5 Migration and Human Capital Stock 
Table 4.4.a and 4.4.b respectively present the estimates for equation (1) by the random 
effects model and OLS for both the years. These estimates show that the relative economic and 
educational variables of the source provinces, such as income levels, unemployment rates, and 
existing human capital stocks, are the determinants of the net outflow migration rates at different 
educational levels. We particularly give attention to the relationship between net outflow 
migration and existing human capital stock in the source provinces. By examining this 
relationship, we seek to identify the provinces most affected by the direct brain drain through 
internal migration by focusing on the determinants of migration. We also investigate the 
differences in the impact of existing human capital stock on migration between 1990 and 2000. 
The results in Table 4.4.a and 4.4.b show several statistically significant relationships 
between net outflow migration and relative existing human capital stock. The positive 
relationship between net outflow migration at a certain educational level and human capital stock 
at the corresponding level can be interpreted by the labor supply push effect. The relative wages 
of labor at a given educational level tends to be lower in provinces that have abundant supplies 
of labor with that level of education; thus, the residents might aspire to higher wages in other 
provinces that are relatively deficient in labor at that educational level. The negative (positive) 
relationship between net outflow migration rate at a given educational level and human capital 
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stock at other educational levels can be understood as the relative labor supply push effect based 
on the complementarity (substitution) in the relative labor market. The results by the random 
effects model and OLS indicate significantly positive coefficients (2.621~3.429 and 1.736~2.089, 
respectively) for the effect of human capital stock on net outflow migration rate at the junior high 
school level. This positive relationship suggests that direct brain drain involving those with 
junior high school degrees in the source province can be affected by the labor supply push effect 
at the same educational level. The estimates by the random effects model reveal positive 
coefficients (2.496~2.598 and 1.067~1.255, respectively) for the effect of human capital stock at 
the junior high school level on the outflow migration rate of the residents with high school and 
college degrees; this points at the relative labor supply push effect based on substitution. In 
addition, we observe a partially significant negative coefficient (−1.904) of the effect of relative 
human capital stock with high school education on the outflow migration rate of the residents 
with junior high school degrees, implying that the relative labor supply push effect based on 
complementarity operates more effectively for adjacent provinces. However, these cross 
relationships between net outflow migration rate at a certain level of education and human 
capital stock at other educational levels can not be consistently explained only by the labor 
supply push effects, as is obvious from the relationship manifest in the case of the residents with 
junior high school and high school degrees. The results indicate the incidence of more net 
outflow migration at all educational levels from provinces with relatively larger populations of 
junior high school graduates. This is presumed to be due to rapid and unbalanced economic 
growth and unfinished nature of the labor market during the transition process. 
Furthermore, Table 4.4.b, which compares the changing effects of human capital stock on 
net outflow migration between 1990 and 2000, projects several statistically significant 
differences. The coefficients of human capital stock with high school education on outflow 
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migration rate for the residents with junior high school degrees significantly changes from 
negative suggesting complementarity in 1990 to positive suggesting substitution in 2000. 
Furthermore, the effects of the relative human capital stock comprising high school graduates 
with respect to the national average on net outflow migration of the residents with college 
degrees shows more positive trends, thereby suggesting more substitution, in 2000. These 
findings might be supported by the fact that the labor market mechanism came to function 
gradually after the reforms while the labor market continued experiencing segmentation in the 
mid-1990s, as suggested by previous works too. 
Second, three kinds of income differentials between source province and other provinces 
are found to be important determinants of net outflow migration rates for migrants at any given 
educational level. The statistically significant negative elasticities of migration rates in the three 
education categories vis-à-vis income differences indicate that the poorer provinces tend to be 
affected by direct brain drain. The elasticities of migration rate with respect to the income 
differences at three different educational levels in the random effects model (−3.112~−2.463, 
−2.720~−1.954, −1.841~−1.233, from the lower levels of education, respectively) suggests that 
the poorer provinces tend to be the source of less educated migrants and vice versa. Furthermore, 
the relative income levels with respect to the surrounding provinces had a greater impact on net 
outflow migration in 2000. The lesser impact of income differences on migrants with college 
degrees is partly explained by the peculiar inclusion of return migration by nonnative college 
graduates, as observed in section 3. 
Finally, we note significantly positive relationships between migration rates at the three 
educational levels and relative unemployment rates, implying equilibrating mechanism for the 
differences in unemployment rates across the provinces, only for the case compared with 
adjacent provinces in 2000. In contrast, the data for 1990 show significantly negative 
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relationships for migrants with college and high school degrees. These results can be interpreted 
to signify that whereas the phenomenon suggested by Harris and Todaro (1970) was valid in 
1990, the equilibrating mechanism for the economic conditions in the adjacent provinces was 
operating more in 2000. While economic incentives to migrate to more promising provinces with 
higher income levels can be noted in both the years, a nationwide equilibrating mechanism was 
not a strong determinant of migration for those who had received education higher than a junior 
high school degree. 
 
IV.6 The Effects of Migration on New Human Capital Investment 
We now present the impacts of interprovincial migration on new human capital 
investment in the succeeding years at the provincial level in China. Table 4.5.a and 4.5.b show 
the estimates of the fixed effects model and random effects model as well as the pooled OLS 
estimates for equations (2a) and (2b). In addition, Table 4.5.c indicates the changes in the effects 
of interprovincial migration on new human capital investment between 1990 and 2000. Our 
results support the presence of positive as well as negative effects of interprovincial migration on 
new human capital investment at the provincial level in China. 
 First, we analyze the effects of gross outflow migration on new human capital 
investment separately at the junior high school, high school, and college levels35 in order to 
check for investment/disinvestment in higher education to secure better prospects vis-à-vis 
migration opportunity. We concentrate on the effects induced by gross outflow migration on 
school enrollments (e.g. high school) at four educational levels: all levels higher (high school and 
college) and lower (junior high school and lower) than the corresponding degree, the 
                                                     
35 We had to take into account the problem of multicollinearity in the estimation of equations (2a) and (2b) 
owing to the correlation of gross outflow/inflow migration rates in the different educational categories. 
Adjacent educational categories demonstrated a high degree of correlation. 
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corresponding degree itself (high school), and one level lower than the corresponding degree 
(junior high school). Our estimates in Table 4.5.a indicate significantly positive coefficients 
(0.425, 0.270~0.296 and 0.071~0.075, respectively, in descending order of education) for the 
effect of gross outflow migration at the same and at higher levels of education on enrollments in 
the corresponding schools at all three educational levels. These positive results could imply that 
the greater probability of migration at levels of education higher than junior high school inspired 
the residents to attend higher schools. On the other hand, although significantly negative impacts 
of gross outflow migration with lower degrees on school enrollments can be observed only for 
high school and college enrollments (the coefficients are −0.116 and −0.164, respectively), we do 
notice negative coefficients for the impacts on migration in many cases, as portended by the 
presence of a disinvestment mechanism. These results could signify that the greater probability 
of migration at lower educational levels discourages the residents from attending higher levels of 
education. As we have observed so far, our empirical results are mostly consistent with the 
proposed existence of investment/disinvestment in higher education to secure better prospects 
vis-à-vis migration opportunity. These results support positive as well as negative effects of gross 
outflow interprovincial migration on new human capital investment through externality, while 
the absolute values of the estimated elasticities suggest that positive externality eclipses negative 
externality at the national level. 
Furthermore, we note statistically significant differences in the effects of gross outflow 
migration on new human capital investment between the two years, focusing on the interaction 
terms in Table 4.5.c. The positive impacts of gross outflow migration with junior high school 
degrees on enrollments in junior high schools appear to be more evident in 2000, while the 
negative impacts of gross outflow migration with lower degrees of education on college 
enrollments more clearly in 1990. The greater tangibility of the positive impacts of gross outflow 
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migration with junior high school degrees on enrollments in corresponding schools in 2000 
appears to have stemmed from relaxations in migration restrictions for the residents with 
relatively lesser education. It is easy to appreciate the increased incentives to achieve relatively 
lower levels of education (such as a junior high school degree) to secure better prospects of 
migration, as the probability of migration with junior high school degrees increased dramatically 
in the 1990s. On the other hand, the reduced impact of gross outflow migration at lower levels of 
education on college enrollments during the 1990s contradicts our expectation based on the fact 
that the probability of migration with junior high school and high school degrees increased and 
nearly equaled that for migration with college degrees from 1990 to 2000. However, we can 
justify the fact that college enrollment is less affected by the probabilities of migration at lower 
educational levels if we concede that the wage premium for college education increased and its 
regional dispersion also swelled during this period. 
Next, we analyze the effects of net outflow migration on new human capital investment 
that can be understood through the relative labor supply effect. We focus on exploring the impact 
on school enrollment (e.g. high school) induced by net outflow migration at different educational 
levels (college, high school, junior high school, and lower). This mechanism of the relative labor 
supply effect induces adjustments in the provincial distribution of human capital at the national 
level already affected by direct brain drain, whereas the mechanism of migration-oriented 
investment/disinvestment in higher education opportunity might affect the total human capital 
formation at the national level. The estimates in Table 4.5.b show statistically significant impacts 
of net outflow migration on enrollments at three different educational levels. We observe 
positive impacts of net outflow migration on corresponding enrollments at these educational 
levels as well as negative impacts of net outflow migration at the junior high school level on high 
school enrollments. Here, we partly find the impacts augmented by relative labor supply effects, 
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which are mainly brought by the migrants at their respective educational levels. Our results 
suggest that the net interprovincial migration at the three educational levels mitigates the direct 
brain drain by encouraging new human capital investment in the corresponding schools at the 
provincial level. Additionally, the net interprovincial migration at the junior high school level can 
be seen to have had a negative impact on high school enrollments. This also mitigates the direct 
brain drain of junior high school graduates, but it does so by discouraging new human capital 
investment at the high school level. The interaction terms in Table 4.5.c also bring out the 
statistically significant differences in the effects of net outflow migration on new human capital 
investment between 1990 and 2000. The positive impacts of net outflow migration with college 
and junior high school degrees on enrollments at the corresponding level tend to be more evident 
in 2000, which entails that the relative labor supply effects of migration were more impacting in 
2000. Our estimates support more positive than negative impacts of net outflow migration on 
new human investment in 2000 as compared with 1990. 
Finally, we study the effects of economic conditions and the accessibility of schools in 
the provinces. The income level has statistically significant effects on educational enrollments at 
all levels but these effects are greater on school enrollment at higher levels; unemployment rates, 
on the other hand, always affect college enrollment. The spatial accessibility of schools 
measured by the ratio of the number of schools to land area has a positive effect on college 
enrollment only. We also seek to assess the monetary cost of education using the ratio of tuition 
costs to educational funds36. Unfortunately, we can apply this only for the OLS estimates of 2000 
(not reported) due to lack of data, and confirm that the estimated results are robust. 
Before concluding, we comment on the results for college enrollments. College 
                                                     
36 Owing to constrictions in the availability of data, we added the ratio of tuition costs to educational funds 
in all educational categories in every equation for the OLS estimate, using only the data for 2000. 
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enrollments from other provinces—a theme that we introduced in Section 3—determined the 
percentage of students who progress to colleges at the provincial level. Our estimates do not 
reflect the impact of gross/net outflow migration with college degrees on college enrollments in 
the native provinces but on enrollments including students coming from other provinces. The 
positive relationship between net inflow migration for college education and return migration by 
college graduates might influence the relationship between college enrollments and gross/net 
outflow migration with college degrees. Unfortunately, this potential problem can not be 
resolved owing to our data availability. 
 
IV.7 Conclusions 
This paper empirically examines the impact of interprovincial migration at different 
educational levels on the creation and distribution of human capital in the source provinces in 
China. First, we seek to identify the provinces most affected by the direct brain drain through 
internal migration by focusing on the determinants of migration. The negative elasticities of 
migration rates vis-à-vis relative income levels suggest that the poorer provinces are more 
affected by direct brain drain at three educational levels. In addition, the higher income 
elasticities for migration with lesser education suggest increasing levels of direct brain drain at 
relatively lower educational levels, such as at the junior high school level, in the poorer 
provinces. Furthermore, if migration probabilities were higher in the provinces abundant with 
corresponding human capital stocks and if the labor supply push effects were to work effectively, 
the differences in human capital stock across provinces would have shown a propensity to 
diminish. However, this is not the case according to our empirical results for the relationship 
between migration and existing human capital stock. Our results indicate the incidence of more 
net outflow migration at any educational level from provinces with relatively larger populations 
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of junior high school graduates. The relationship between migration and existing human capital 
stock can not be completely explained by the labor supply push effects presumably due to rapid 
and unbalanced economic growth and the unfinished nature of the labor market during the 
transition process. 
Second, we examine both external economies and diseconomies of gross outflow 
migration on new human capital investment. The underlying mechanism of those effects is based 
on investment/disinvestment in higher education to secure better prospects vis-à-vis migration 
opportunity. Our estimates support both positive and negative externalities of gross outflow 
migration and suggest that the positive “brain effect” eclipses the negative one at the national 
level. 
Third, we analyze the effects of net outflow migration on new human capital investment 
in the forms of responses to the changes caused by migration in relative wages associated with 
the fluctuations in relative labor supply. Our results imply that the direct brain drain is mitigated 
by relative labor supply effects by both encouraging new educational investment at the 
corresponding levels and discouraging enrollments at higher levels. While we observed positive 
as well as negative impacts of net outflow migration on school enrollments, the data for 2000 
showed more positive and less negative impacts. This might suggest that relative labor supply 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Variables in Variables Definition
Equations in Regressions
MIGi MIGO Number of all migrants from province i to other provinces within the previous five years (1985-90/1995-2000) 
/(Population in province i in 1990/2000 + Number of all net outflow migrants in 1985-1990/1995-2000)  (%)
MIGI Number of all migrants moving from other provinces to province i within the previous five years (1985-90/1995-2000) 
/(Population in province i in 1990/2000 + Number of all net outflow migrants in 1985-1990/1995-2000)  (%)
MIGN MIGO/MIGI
EDUCATION MIGO Number of migrants at each educational level from province i to other provinces within the previous
five years (1985-90/1995-2000) / (Number of people at each educational level in province i in 1990/2000
 + Number of net outflow migrants at each educational level from province i in 1985-1990/1995-2000) (%)
EDUCATION MIGI Number of migrants at each educational level from other provinces to province i within the previous 
five years (1985-90/1995-2000) / (Number of people at each educational level in province i in 1990/2000
 + Number of net outflow migrants at each educational level from province i in 1985-1990/1995-2000) (%)











JMIGO ABOVE     EDUCATION = junior secondary schools and above
HMIGO ABOVE     EDUCATION = senior secondary or secondary technical schools and above
HMIGO BELLOW     EDUCATION = junior secondary schools and below
CMIGO BELLOW     EDUCATION = senior secondary or secondary technical schools and below
PCGDPDIFFi PCGDPDIFF GDP per capita of province i / national average GDP per capita (in 1985/95)
PCGDPDIFFA GDP per capita of province i / average GDP per capita weighted by inverse of distance 
from province i (in 1985/95)
PCGDPDIFFS GDP per capita of province i / average GDP per capita for surrounding provinces of province i, 
weighted by inverse of distance from province i (in 1985/95) 
PCGDPAVEi PCGDPAVE GDP per capita of province i at 1990 constant prices (yuan, in 1990-92/2000-02)
HUMADIFFi HUMAEDUCATION DIFF EDU ATTAINMENT in province i/ national average EDU ATTAINMENT (in 1985/95)
HUMAEDUCATION DIFFA EDU ATTAINMENT in province i/ average EDU ATTAINMENTweighted by inverse of distance 
from province i  (in 1985/95)
HUMAEDUCATION DIFFS EDU ATTAINMENT in province i/ average EDU ATTAINMENTfor surrounding provinces of province i,  
weighted by inverse of distance from province i  (in 1985/95)
    EDU ATTAINMENT (Number of people with each educational degrees in province i in 1990/2000 + number of net outflow migrants 
with each educational degrees from province i between 1985-1990/1995-2000)
 / (population in province i (in 1990/2000) + number of all net outflow migrants (in 1985-1990/1995-2000))  (%)
HUMAJDIFF
HUMAJDIFFA EDUCATION = junior secondary schools
HUMAJDIFFS
HUMAHDIFF
HUMAHDIFFA EDUCATION = senior secondary or secondary technical schools
HUMAHDIFFS
HUMACDIFF
HUMACDIFFA EDUCATION = junior college and above
HUMACDIFFS
EDUAVEi EDUJ Average percentage of students who go to junior secondary or secondary technical schools in province i 
vis-à-vis graduates of primary schools (in 1990-92/2000-02) (%)
    number of new enrollment in junior secondary and secondary technical schools / number of graduate 
    from primary school *100
EDUH Average percentage of students who go to senior secondary or secondary technical schools in province i 
vis-à-vis graduates of primary schools (in 1990-92/2000-02) (%)
    number of new enrollment in senior secondary or secondary technical schools / number of graduate from junior secondary 
    and secondary technical schools * EDUJ
EDUC Average percentage of students who go to junior colleges or above in province i 
vis-à-vis graduates of primary schools (in 1990-92/2000-02) (%)
    number of new enrollment in institutes of higher education / number of graduate from senior secondary schools 
    or technical schools * EDUH
UEMPDIFFi UEMPDIFF Urban registered unemployment rate in province i / national average urban registered unemployment rate (in 1985/1995)
UEMPDIFFA Urban registered unemployment rate in province i / average urban registered unemployment rate
 weighted by inverse of distance from province i  (in 1985/1995)
UEMPDIFFS Urban registered unemployment rate in province i / average urban registered unemployment rate for 
surrounding provinces of province i weighted by inverse of distance (in 1985/1995)
UEMPAVEi UEMPAVE Average urban registered unemployment rate in provnce i (in 1990-92/2000-02)(%)
TEMPDIFFi TEMPDIFF Average annual temparature of major city of province i/ average annual temparature of 
major 30 cities of provinces (in 1985/1995)
TEMPDIFFA Average annual temparature of major city of province i/ average annual temparature of major 30 cities of provinces 
weighted by inverse of distance from province i (in 1985/1995)
TEMPDIFFS Average annual temparature of major city of province i/ average annual temparature of major 30 cities 
of surrounding provinces weighted by inverse of distance from province i (in 1985/1995)
NUMSCHOOLAVEi NUMJ Number of junior secondary schools per land area (10000 sq.km) (in 1990-92/2000-02)
NUMH Number of senior secondary or secondary technical schools per land area (10000 sq.km) (in 1990-92/2000-02)
NUMC Number of junior college or above per land area (10000 sq.km) (in 1990-92/2000-02)
TUITIONi TUITION Tuition and Miscellaneous Fee/Educational Funds (in 1990-92/2000-02)(%)
Table 4.3: Definitions of Variables
    EDUCATION = primary schools and below
    EDUCATION = junior secondary schools
    EDUCATION = junior secondary schools and above
    EDUCATION = senior secondary or secondary technical schools 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.5.a: Effects of Gross Outflow Migration on New Human Capital Investment
1. Effects on College Enrollment
Dependent Variable EDUC EDUC EDUC EDUC EDUC EDUC
CONSTANT -10.193 *** -9.922 *** -10.200 *** -3.356 *** -3.613 *** -3.168 ***
(1.991) (1.437) (1.870) (0.992) (0.993) (0.938)
UEMPAVE -0.530 * -0.513 ** -0.537 * -0.387 *** -0.395 *** -0.405 ***
(0.259) (0.240) (0.264) (0.140) (0.133) (0.137)
PCGDPAVE 1.601 *** 1.565 *** 1.602 *** 0.619 *** 0.662 *** 0.599 ***
(0.274) (0.202) (0.258) (0.129) (0.130) (0.123)
HMIGO -0.033 -0.164 **
(0.138) (0.080)
CMIGO BELLOW -0.023 -0.093
(0.117) (0.070)
CMIGO 0.114 0.093 0.126 0.425 *** 0.378 *** 0.475 ***
(0.257) (0.230) (0.272) (0.118) (0.107) (0.119)
NUMC 0.269 0.298 0.276 0.088 * 0.090 * 0.069
(0.535) (0.506) (0.524) (0.049) (0.048) (0.050)
R-squared 0.691 0.687 0.689 0.889 0.886 0.893
Number of Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58
2. Effects on High School Enrollment
Dependent Variable EDUH EDUH EDUH EDUH EDUH EDUH
CONSTANT 0.333 0.814 *** 0.665 * -0.067 0.306 0.309
(0.371) (0.314) (0.368) (0.547) (0.662) (0.670)
UEMPAVE -0.052 -0.106 -0.076 -0.034 -0.083 -0.079
(0.074) (0.072) (0.082) (0.067) (0.066) (0.077)
PCGDPAVE 0.420 *** 0.394 *** 0.404 *** 0.478 *** 0.474 *** 0.472 ***
(0.039) (0.038) (0.040) (0.085) (0.089) (0.095)
JMIGO -0.071 -0.015
(0.090) (0.111)
HMIGO ABOVE 0.270 *** 0.296 **
(0.098) (0.120)
HMIGO BELLOW -0.116 * -0.127
(0.064) (0.086)
HMIGO 0.058 0.139 0.055 0.072
(0.043) (0.112) (0.046) (0.131)
NUMH -0.029 -0.038 -0.031 -0.045 -0.063 * -0.060
(0.030) (0.033) (0.034) (0.043) (0.034) (0.042)
R-squared 0.696 0.639 0.641 0.700 0.648 0.648
Number of Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58
3. Effects on Junior High School Enrollment
Dependent Variable EDUJ EDUJ EDUJ EDUJ EDUJ EDUJ
CONSTANT 2.854 *** 2.870 *** 2.865 *** 3.076 *** 3.169 *** 3.143 ***
(0.434) (0.451) (0.457) (0.196) (0.207) (0.220)
UEMPAVE -0.075 -0.097 * -0.100 * -0.037 -0.048 * -0.048 *
(0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
PCGDPAVE 0.171 *** 0.181 *** 0.183 *** 0.176 *** 0.171 *** 0.173 ***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.024) (0.026) (0.027)
BMIGO 0.008 0.024 -0.025 -0.013
(0.033) (0.038) (0.019) (0.020)
JMIGO ABOVE 0.075 * 0.071 ***
(0.043) (0.025)
JMIGO 0.062 *** 0.040 0.033 ** 0.044 *
(0.022) (0.041) (0.012) (0.026)
NUMJ 0.053 0.041 0.044 -0.010 * -0.012 ** -0.012 **
(0.081) (0.084) (0.085) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
R-squared 0.548 0.570 0.554 0.746 0.726 0.728
Number of Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58
Notes: 
1. We show one of the fixed effect estimates and random effect estimates for each schooling enrollment according to Hausman’s test.
2. Dummy of year 2000 is included in OLS.







Table 4.5.b:  Effects of Net Outflow Migration on New Human Capital Investment
1. Effects on College Enrollment
Dependent Variable EDUC EDUC EDUC EDUC EDUC EDUC
CONSTANT -9.187 *** -9.269 *** -9.212 *** -3.123 ** -2.520 ** -1.876
(1.005) (1.021) (1.054) (1.155) (1.149) (1.362)
UEMPAVE -0.435 * -0.463 * -0.488 * -0.374 ** -0.366 ** -0.300 *
(0.243) (0.248) (0.261) (0.152) (0.157) (0.154)
PCGDPAVE 1.472 *** 1.482 *** 1.474 *** 0.674 *** 0.590 *** 0.493 **
(0.179) (0.181) (0.188) (0.148) (0.147) (0.180)
BMIGN -0.017 0.126
(0.155) (0.093)
JMIGN 0.122 -0.261 *
(0.198) (0.148)
HMIGN -0.053 -0.155 -0.093 * 0.079
(0.074) (0.150) (0.047) (0.105)
CMIGN 0.149 0.205 0.210 0.125 *** 0.196 *** 0.179 ***
(0.120) (0.145) (0.150) (0.044) (0.058) (0.058)
NUMC 0.329 0.351 0.402 0.111 ** 0.118 *** 0.156 ***
(0.481) (0.487) (0.552) (0.046) (0.043) (0.053)
R-squared 0.714 0.707 0.689 0.868 0.875 0.883
Number of Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58
2. Effects on High School Enrollment
Dependent Variable EDUH EDUH EDUH EDUH EDUH EDUH
CONSTANT 0.792 ** 0.876 *** 0.706 ** 0.340 0.940 0.772
(0.320) (0.311) (0.334) (0.709) (0.769) (0.832)
UEMPAVE -0.107 -0.030 -0.029 -0.082 -0.025 -0.017
(0.072) (0.077) (0.077) (0.069) (0.085) (0.090)
PCGDPAVE 0.405 *** 0.377 *** 0.398 *** 0.478 *** 0.370 *** 0.384 ***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.041) (0.098) (0.114) (0.122)
BMIGN 0.076 0.059
(0.051) (0.059)
JMIGN -0.108 ** -0.188 *** -0.111 ** -0.175 **
(0.047) (0.071) (0.047) (0.083)
HMIGN 0.029 0.143 *** 0.160 *** 0.022 0.135 ** 0.129 **
(0.023) (0.054) (0.059) (0.031) (0.053) (0.056)
CMIGN 0.004 0.041
(0.042) (0.051)
NUMH -0.043 -0.029 -0.024 -0.069 * -0.033 -0.020
(0.032) (0.031) (0.033) (0.035) (0.042) (0.041)
R-squared 0.635 0.665 0.674 0.645 0.667 0.682
Number of Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58
3. Effects on Junior High School Enrollment
Dependent Variable EDUJ EDUJ EDUJ EDUJ EDUJ EDUJ
CONSTANT 2.519 *** 2.454 *** 1.945 *** 2.940 *** 2.993 *** 3.049 ***
(0.439) (0.461) (0.481) (0.211) (0.178) (0.199)
UEMPAVE -0.088 -0.087 -0.061 -0.051 * -0.048 * -0.039
(0.052) (0.053) (0.055) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026)
PCGDPAVE 0.213 *** 0.218 *** 0.222 *** 0.210 *** 0.202 *** 0.190 ***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.029) (0.025) (0.031)
BMIGN 0.018 0.040 -0.023 -0.016
(0.033) (0.031) (0.019) (0.023)
JMIGN 0.037 ** 0.022 -0.043 0.026 *** 0.045 ** 0.015
(0.014) (0.031) (0.047) (0.007) (0.019) (0.041)
HMIGN 0.077 * 0.034
(0.038) (0.028)
CMIGN -0.076 ** -0.011
(0.031) (0.009)
NUMJ 0.069 0.077 0.177 * -0.021 *** -0.022 *** -0.017
(0.085) (0.088) (0.097) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010)
R-squared 0.457 0.428 0.257 0.745 0.752 0.761
Number of Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58
Notes: 
1. We show one of the fixed effect estimates and random effect estimates for each schooling enrollment according to Hausman’s test.
2. Dummy of year 2000 is included in OLS.








Table 4.5.c: Effects of Gross and Net Outflow Migrations on New Human Capital Investment in 1990 and 2000 by OLS
1. Effects on College Enrollment
Dependent Variable EDUC EDUC EDUC Dependent Variable EDUC EDUC EDUC
Independent Variable Independent Variable
CONSTANT -3.471 *** -3.561 *** -3.429 *** CONSTANT -3.197 ** -2.307 ** -1.959
(0.988) (0.974) (0.911) (1.175) (1.113) (1.274)
UEMPAVE -0.345 ** -0.389 *** -0.350 ** UEMPAVE -0.359 ** -0.334 ** -0.329 **
(0.156) (0.133) (0.154) (0.138) (0.145) (0.152)
PCGDPAVE 0.652 *** 0.670 *** 0.664 *** PCGDPAVE 0.685 *** 0.562 *** 0.513
(0.134) (0.130) (0.127) (0.151) (0.142) (0.168)
HMIGO -0.486 *** BMIGN 0.211 *
(0.144) (0.107)
HMIGO*YEAR00 0.395 ** BMIGN*YEAR00 -0.285 *
(0.149) (0.144)
CMIGO BELLOW -0.324 ** JMIGN -0.385 ***
(0.142) (0.132)
CMIGO BELLOW*YEAR00 0.277 * JMIGN*YEAR00 0.599 **
(0.158) (0.241)
CMIGO 0.352 ** 0.311 ** 0.457 *** HMIGN -0.281 *** 0.003
(0.150) (0.138) (0.156) (0.081) (0.117)
CMIGO*YEAR00 0.099 0.110 0.032 HMIGN*YEAR00 0.165 * -0.316
(0.151) (0.130) (0.167) (0.091) (0.201)
CMIGN 0.024 0.151 * 0.129
(0.072) (0.079) (0.077)
CMIGN*YEAR00 0.163 ** 0.137 0.204 *
(0.074) (0.110) (0.102)
NUMC 0.069 0.089 * 0.035 NUMC 0.109 ** 0.104 ** 0.127 ***
(0.051) (0.048) (0.049) (0.045) (0.039) (0.044)
R-squared 0.897 0.887 0.906 R-squared 0.876 0.895 0.910
Number of Observations 58 58 58 Number of Observations 58 58 58
2. Effects on High School Enrollment
Dependent Variable EDUH EDUH EDUH Dependent Variable EDUH EDUH EDUH
Independent Variable Independent Variable
CONSTANT -0.052 0.292 0.490 CONSTANT 0.412 0.951 0.821
(0.527) (0.677) (0.624) (0.706) (0.734) (0.772)
UEMPAVE -0.030 -0.076 -0.062 UEMPAVE -0.074 0.009 0.012
(0.071) (0.075) (0.083) (0.076) (0.090) (0.099)
PCGDPAVE 0.471 *** 0.481 *** 0.450 *** PCGDPAVE 0.471 *** 0.366 *** 0.373 ***
(0.086) (0.093) (0.093) (0.098) (0.109) (0.114)
JMIGO -0.205 BMIGN 0.065
(0.153) (0.070)
JMIGO*YEAR00 0.349 BMIGN*YEAR00 -0.065
(0.206) (0.102)
HMIGO ABOVE 0.349 ** JMIGN -0.166 *** -0.241 ***
(0.149) (0.048) (0.086)
HMIGO ABOVE*YEAR00 -0.129 JMIGN*YEAR00 0.171 * 0.293
(0.164) (0.092) (0.176)
HMIGO BELLOW -0.195 ** HMIGN -0.038 0.141 ** 0.179 **
(0.083) (0.044) (0.064) (0.071)
HMIGO BELLOW*YEAR00 0.124 HMIGN*YEAR00 0.068 * -0.134 -0.289 *
(0.138) (0.034) (0.116) (0.158)
HMIGO 0.018 0.211 CMIGN 0.011
(0.086) (0.180) (0.054)
HMIGO*YEAR00 0.047 -0.317 CMIGN*YEAR00 0.112
(0.079) (0.225) (0.076)
NUMH -0.049 -0.067 * -0.072 * NUMH -0.075 ** -0.037 -0.017
(0.047) (0.035) (0.042) (0.034) (0.041) (0.039)
R-squared 0.705 0.649 0.671 R-squared 0.654 0.695 0.724
Number of Observations 58 58 58 Number of Observations 58 58 58
Notes: 
1. All regressions include dummy of year 2000.
2. *,**, *** Statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Standard errors (robust in OLS) are in parentheses.
Gross Outflow Net Outflow




3. Effects on Junior High School Enrollment
Dependent Variable EDUJ EDUJ EDUJ Dependent Variable EDUJ EDUJ EDUJ
Independent Variable Independent Variable
CONSTANT 3.077 *** 3.179 *** 3.146 *** CONSTANT 3.026 *** 3.098 *** 3.088 ***
(0.209) (0.227) (0.241) (0.239) (0.214) (0.231)
UEMPAVE -0.031 -0.034 -0.037 UEMPAVE -0.030 -0.015 -0.016
(0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.029) (0.030)
PCGDPAVE 0.177 *** 0.172 *** 0.177 *** PCGDPAVE 0.193 *** 0.180 *** 0.183 ***
(0.024) (0.028) (0.029) (0.033) (0.030) (0.034)
BMIGO -0.029 0.001 BMIGN -0.045 -0.042
(0.041) (0.041) (0.045) (0.052)
BMIGO*YEAR00 0.005 -0.033 BMIGN*YEAR00 0.029 0.025
(0.047) (0.045) (0.051) (0.056)
JMIGO ABOVE 0.049 JMIGN -0.005 0.030 0.024
(0.056) (0.014) (0.043) (0.066)
JMIGO ABOVE*YEAR00 0.027 JMIGN*YEAR00 0.035 *** 0.012 0.028
(0.061) (0.012) (0.048) (0.064)
JMIGO -0.008 -0.005 HMIGN 0.003
(0.030) (0.042) (0.047)






NUMJ -0.012 * -0.015 ** -0.015 ** NUMJ -0.017 ** -0.017 ** -0.018 *
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010)
R-squared 0.749 0.741 0.747 R-squared 0.774 0.787 0.791
Number of Observations 58 58 58 Number of Observations 58 58 58
Notes: 
1. All regressions include dummy of year 2000.
2. *,**, *** Statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Standard errors (robust in OLS) are in parentheses.
Gross Outflow Net Outflow





Figure 4.1: The Relationship between Gross Inflow Migration Rate and Gross Outflow
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Observation Mean StandardDeviation Observation Mean
Standard
Deviation
BMIGO 29 0.798 0.379 29 1.844 1.461
BMIGN 29 1.329 1.406 29 2.763 3.826
JMIGO 29 1.750 0.865 29 4.372 4.082
JMIGN 29 1.399 1.157 29 4.411 6.591
JMIGO ABOVE 29 2.057 0.803 29 4.269 3.560
HMIGO 29 2.170 0.999 29 3.625 2.805
HMIGN 29 1.288 0.671 29 3.320 4.863
HMIGO ABOVE 29 2.680 0.965 29 3.848 2.502
HMIGO BELLOW 29 1.136 0.485 29 3.070 2.662
CMIGO 29 5.772 2.409 29 4.372 2.267
CMIGN 29 1.735 1.377 29 2.649 3.293
CMIGO BELLOW 29 1.268 0.502 29 3.148 2.662
PCGDPDIFF 29 1.162 0.862 29 1.090 0.676
PCGDPDIFFA 29 0.969 0.722 29 0.973 0.550
PCGDPDIFFS 28 1.096 0.586 28 1.095 0.417
PCGDPAVE 29 2035.273 1193.152 29 5298.984 3223.033
HUMAJDIFF 29 0.993 0.199 29 0.960 0.168
HUMAJDIFFA 29 1.004 0.178 29 0.999 0.156
HUMAJDIFFS 29 1.043 0.206 29 1.022 0.174
HUMAHDIFF 29 1.128 0.467 29 1.108 0.381
HUMAHDIFFA 29 1.016 0.414 29 1.006 0.333
HUMAHDIFFS 29 1.083 0.438 29 1.056 0.311
HUMACDIFF 29 1.321 1.344 29 1.219 0.792
HUMACDIFFA 29 0.984 0.948 29 1.003 0.618
HUMACDIFFS 29 1.253 0.949 29 1.146 0.586
EDUJ 29 79.711 10.782 29 93.773 4.665
EDUH 29 37.518 12.071 29 52.760 13.954
EDUC 29 7.653 8.771 29 24.132 15.842
UEMPDIFF 29 1.144 0.808 29 1.117 0.525
UEMPDIFFA 29 1.061 0.730 29 1.028 0.417
UEMPDIFFS 29 1.110 0.724 29 1.014 0.317
UEMPAVE 29 2.532 1.008 29 3.477 0.662
TEMPDIFF 29 1.013 0.402 29 1.012 0.373
TEMPDIFFA 29 0.958 0.312 29 0.964 0.295
TEMPDIFFS 29 0.974 0.169 29 0.980 0.175
NUMJ 29 184.459 169.409 29 171.832 165.728
NUMH 29 97.894 138.225 29 58.245 101.941
NUMC 29 6.590 16.002 29 6.728 14.390
TUITION 29 15.593 4.060
1900 2000
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Three articles in this dissertation handle contemporary issues related to economic 
globalization and its various implications for the domestic economies. To be more specific, these 
essays discuss cross border capital transaction and inter-regional movement of human capital. 
Chapters II and III are in the field of international finance or open economy macroeconomics; 
they advance our understandings of the function and limitation of expanding international 
financial market. Chapter IV studies interprovincial migration in China resulted from its rapid 
industrialization when it becomes more incorporated into the world economy. 
Chapter II argues that default option is the key driver for the observed asymmetries in the 
cyclical features of the fiscal policy between developed and emerging market countries, and in 
particular procyclical government consumption and transfer payments in emerging market 
countries. The default option is a sort of necessary evil in the sovereign borrowings given the 
unenforceable nature of the contracts due to sovereign immunity and the lack of an international 
proxy for the domestic bankruptcy court. This incompleteness, which is particularly relevant to 
the emerging market countries, severely constrains the optimal fiscal policy stance and 
intertemporal consumption smoothness over the business cycle. 
Chapter III provides conclusions at odds with the conventional wisdom on the gain from 
international financial integration. While previous empirical works point out failures of risk 
sharing, the results of this chapter indicate improved consumption risk sharing through financial 
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integration on the whole. Particularly, OECD countries are shown to be well-insured against 
predictable change in transitory income. Furthermore, the results support the hypothesis that 
financial integration leads to an even larger adjustment in consumption in response to a 
permanent shock to income growth. This can explain the higher relative volatility of 
consumption growth in the 1990s observed in the emerging market countries, which has been 
interpreted as suggesting less successful international risk sharing in those countries. 
Chapter IV empirically examines the impacts of interprovincial migration at different 
educational levels on the creation and distribution of human capital in the source provinces based 
on Chinese provincial level data. We observe both external economies and diseconomies of gross 
outflow migration on new human capital investment which are consistent with the mechanism of 
migration-oriented investment/disinvestment in higher education at source provinces, and find 
that this positive externality eclipses the negative one at the national level. Moreover, the effects 
of net outflow migration on new human capital investment based on the changes in relative labor 
supply mitigate direct brain drain by both encouraging and discouraging school enrollments at 
various levels, whereas estimates support more positive than negative impacts in 2000 as 
compared with 1990. These results can be interpreted as favorable for easing regional inequality 
as well as contributing economics growth. We observe invisible hands which help to restore the 
availability of human capital at provincial level which is disturbed by the large scale migration of 
educated workers. More importantly, incentive mechanisms are shown to increase the new 
human capital investment at the national level which can be a good foundation of sustainable 
economic growth in China. 
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